

[This Document is the Property of Her Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. March 1897.

CONFIDENTIAL

(6875.)

Fo 403

220

F.O.

403

PART 7.

Filmed Complete
for P. R. O.
FILM LIBRARY.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF TUNIS.

1895.

220

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
1	Consul-General Haggard	13	Feb. 4, 1895	Reception in audience by the Bey. Reports ..	1
2	" " "	3 Secret	6,	French policy in Tunis. Attempt to reduce foreign trade, &c. Desire to renew Treaties with England and Italy. ..	1
3	" " "	4	6,	M. Millet's tour in north. Has accepted invitation to join. Details as to itinerary and objects. ..	2
4	" " "	6 Confidential	Mar. 6,	M. Millet's tour in north. Reports his return. Transmits extracts from "Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	3
5	" " "	8 Confidential	12,	M. Millet's tour in north. M. Millet's expressions of pleasure at his having accompanied him ..	4
6	" " "	8A	22,	Artillery arsenal at Bizerta. Transmits Decree classifying as a military post ..	6
7	" " "	9 Confidential	15,	Conscription. Decision to extend to south and frontier districts ..	7
8	" " "	10	16,	Raising of rank of Officer Commanding the troops. Reasons for ..	7
9	" " "	11 Confidential	16,	Attacks of local press on M. Millet. Transmits "Petite Tunisie" ..	8
10	" " "	12 Confidential	16,	Troops in Regency. Details as to numbers and distribution of ..	8
11	" " "	13	17,	System of government by "Contrôleurs." Explains ..	8
12	" " "	14	18,	Italian colonists. M. Millet's advice to submit themselves to French Regulations ..	9
13	" " "	15	18,	Tobacco and salt monopolies. Intention to abolish ..	9
14	" " "	16 Confidential	19,	Relations between France and Tunis. Suggested establishment of "Bonderband" between ..	10
15	" " "	17 Confidential	20,	The Resident-General. His character and ability. Intentions as regards reform of taxation. Opposition to ..	11
16	" " "	18 Confidential	20,	French intentions as regards the "Hinterland." Information obtained on his journey with M. Millet ..	12
17	" " "	21	25,	Expenses incurred by France since the occupation. Extract from "Dépêche Tunisienne" giving details ..	12
18	Sir P. Currie	142 Tel. Africa	Apr. 20,	Rumoured intended occupation of Zuara by French. Italian Government are urging Turkish Government to press France to come to an agreement as to frontier. Is he to support representation? ..	13
19	To Sir P. Currie	Telegraphic Africa	22,	Rumoured intended occupation of Zuara by French. May support Italian Ambassador ..	14

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
20	Consul-General Haggard	23 Confidential	Apr. 2, 1895	Treaties of England and Italy with Tunis. Transmits extract from "Union." Desire of French to abrogate ..	17
21	" " "	25 Confidential	26,	Ports and fortress of Bizerta. Transmits article in "Union" ..	18
22	" " "	27 Confidential	May 7,	Increased facilities of communication with interior. French fully alive to. Important for British trade ..	19
23	" " "	28 Confidential	9,	Ports at Bizerta. Information respecting ..	19
24	" " "	31 Confidential	22,	Current in Bizerta Canal. Dangerous character of ..	20
25	" " "	32 Confidential	23,	French position in Tunis. Plain language by Minister of Agriculture respecting ..	21
26	" " "	35 Confidential	28,	French position in Tunis. Present system of Protectorate gives them a freer hand than regular Colonial Administration ..	21
27	" " "	Telegraphic	June 17,	New Secretary of Commissary of Police. Appointment of man convicted of torturing two British subjects at Krouan. Should he make representations? ..	21
28	To Consul-General Haggard	Telegraphic	18,	New Secretary of Commissary of Police. To mention matter unofficially to Resident ..	22
29	Consul-General Haggard	Telegraphic	19,	New Secretary of Commissary of Police. Resident says he will not be appointed Commissary ..	22
29A	" " "	36	May 30,	North African Railway, and proposed expedition of General Albegro. Extracts from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	22A
30	" " "	37 Confidential	June 14,	Proposed Customs Union with France. Transmits extract from "Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	22
31	" " "	38 Confidential	14,	Port of Bizerta. Unusable for large ship, owing to difficulty of entry ..	23
32	" " "	40 Confidential	17,	Customs Union with France. Transmits article from "Tunis Française." British trade far greater than appears from Returns ..	23
33	" " "	41 Confidential	17,	Attempt to divert Boudan trade to Gabes. General Albegro's caravan. Information respecting ..	24
34	" " "	42 Confidential	18,	Incident respecting appointment of Austrian Consular Agent at Goletha. High-handed conduct of M. Millet ..	25
35	" " "	43 Confidential	19,	Appointment of Camus as Secretary of Commissary of Police. Conversation with M. Millet respecting ..	26
36	" " "	44 Confidential	20,	Appointment of Camus as Secretary of Commissary of Police. Addition to above ..	27
37	" " "	45 Confidential	24,	Appointment of Camus as Secretary of Commissary of Police. Scene between M. Millet and the ex-Commissary ..	28
38	" " "	47 Confidential	24,	Port of Bizerta. Removal of rock will take three or four months (No. 31) ..	30
39	" " "	48 Confidential	July 1,	Appointment of Camus. Article from the "Union" ..	31
40	" " "	49 Confidential	3,	Appointment of Camus. M. Millet states he will be transferred to Finance Department ..	32

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
41	Consul-General Hag-gard	50 Confidential	July 8, 1895	Revision of Anglo-Tunisian Treaty. M. Millet intention to bring forward in Paris ..	32
42	" " "	53	3	Appointment of Camus. Has expressed antipathies at proposed transfer to Finance Department ..	39
43	" " "	54	11	Appointment of Camus. Transmits correspondence with French Delegate ..	34
44	" " "	24 Commercial Confidential	23	Foreign trade of Tunis. Transmits Table showing ..	35
45	" " "	25 Commercial Confidential	23	Proposed revision of Anglo-Tunisian Treaty. Transmits article from "Tunisienne Française" ..	37
46	Mr. Howard	263	Aug. 13.	Italian and English Treaties with Tunis. Transmits article from "Matin" ..	39
47	" " "	265	14	Italian and English Treaties with Tunis. Transmits article from "Débats" ..	41
48	Consul-General Hag-gard	59	July 29.	Port of Bizerta. Transmits extracts from "Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	42
49	" " "	26 Commercial Confidential	29	Tunisian phosphate beds. Transmits extracts from "Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	43
50	" " "	60 Confidential	Aug. 5.	Italian Treaty. Transmits "Dépêche" advocating denunciation of ..	47
51	" " "	61 Confidential	10	Rock in Bizerta Channel. Will endeavour to ascertain depth of water. Rock is being removed ..	50
52	Mr. Edwards	140	14	Italian Treaty. Italian Government expect to receive denunciation, and fear effect on their trade ..	50
53	Mr. Howard	268	18	Italian Treaty. Reported renouncement by M. Hanotian that denunciation had been made to Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs ..	52
54	Mr. Edwards	142	20	Italian Treaty. Italian Government have received formal denunciation of ..	52
55	Consul-General Hag-gard	66	18	Italian Treaty. Italian Consul-General has received denunciation ..	53
56	To Mr. Edwards	21 Commercial Confidential	24	British Treaty with Tunis. Interview with General Fervers on question of revision ..	53
57	Consul-General Hag-gard	62 Confidential	11	Port of Bizerta. Italian Agent considers it a complete failure ..	53
58	" " "	63 Confidential	11	Italian Treaty. Conversation with Italian Agent ..	54
59	" " "	65 Confidential	12	Gulf of Bon Gers. Visits of French ships of war to take soundings. Possible establishment of naval port ..	54
60	" " "	67	Sept. 2.	Change of railway gauge. Transmits article in "Dépêche Tunisienne" ..	54
61	" " "	68 Confidential	9	Native Tunisian troops' complaint that they have not been used in Tonquin or Madagascar ..	57
62	" " "	69	11	Transfer of Camus (No. 43). Reports ..	57

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
63	Consul-General Hag-gard	70 Confidential	Sept. 13, 1895	Denunciation of Italian Treaty. Conversation with Italian Agent ..	58
64	" " "	71 Confidential	13	Strategic importance of railways (No. 60). Remarks of M. Dobler on ..	59
65	" " "	72 Confidential	16	Extension of telegraph line to Tripoli. Possible prelude to French advance. Transmits letter from Vice-Consul at Sfax ..	59
66	" " "	74 Confidential	30	Denunciation of Italian Treaty. Reply of Italian Agent to French Delegate ..	60
67	" " "	74* Confidential	Oct. 7.	Rock in Bizerta Canal. Transmits report by M. Profit. Considers its destruction certain ..	61
68	" " "	77	20	Rank of Officer Commanding troops (No. 6). Believes old arrangement will be returned to ..	63
69	" " "	78	21	Anglo-Tunisian Treaty. Transmits extract from "Dépêche Tunisienne" containing alleged letter from Lord Salisbury to Manchester Chamber of Commerce ..	66
70	" " "	80 Confidential	26	Injury to Bizerta harbour by gale. Transmits extract from "Union" ..	67
71	" " "	81 Confidential	30	More conciliatory tone of M. Millet towards Italian Agent ..	69
72	" " "	82 Confidential	30	Anglo-Tunisian Treaty. Transmits article in "Dépêche" ..	69
73	" " "	83 Confidential	30	Return of Resident-General. Resumed general activity on account of. Armed caravan scheme to Soudan ..	70
74	" " "	84 Confidential	Nov. 5.	Injury to Bizerta harbour by gale (No. 76). Transmits report ..	71
75	" " "	86 Confidential	18	Injury to Bizerta harbour by gale. Further confirmation ..	73
76	" " "	80 Confidential	19	Construction of arsenal at Bizerta. Tenders are invited. Transmits despatch from Acting Consular Agent ..	74
77	" " "	91 Confidential	31	More conciliatory tone of "Dépêche" towards Italian colony ..	74
78	" " "	92 Confidential	27	Damage to fishery works in Lake of Bizerta. Transmits notice from "Union" ..	75
79	" " "	93 Confidential	28	Construction of arsenal at Bizerta (No. 76). Tenders asked amount to 192,172 fr. ..	76

Filmed Complete
for P. R. O.
FILM LIBRARY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Tunis.

PART 7.

No. 1.

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Tunis, February 4, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I was this morning received in audience by the Bey on my entering on my functions as Her Majesty's Consul-General.

I was attended by Mr. Profelt, the British Vice-Consul, and the French Minister Resident, in his capacity of Foreign Minister, accompanied me in his carriage, escorted by a squadron of cavalry, and presented me to His Highness, who welcomed me very cordially. After inquiring warmly after the health of Her Majesty the Queen, he expressed his satisfaction that a Diplomatic officer of the rank of Minister should have been appointed here as Her Majesty's Consul-General. I may mention that this had been particularly explained to the Bey by the French Resident, who evidently takes it as a compliment to France also that such an appointment should have been made.

After my replying in what were, I trust, suitable terms, the interview ended with a warm reiteration on the part of His Highness of the cordial feelings entertained by him towards the Queen and her Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 2.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 3. Secret.)

My Lord,

Tunis, February 6, 1895.

YOUR Lordship is aware that since the French occupation of Tunis their policy has been chiefly directed towards reducing foreign trade, foreign influence, and, if possible, foreign population within the Regency.

The chief objects of the measures, direct and indirect, in which, with that view, they have been incessantly occupied, have been the Italian and Maltese colonies, especially the former.

These settlements are composed generally of thrifty and hard-working individuals, and are very numerous, the Italian being estimated at numbering over 40,000, and the Maltese at about 18,000, throughout the Regency, while the French, with the exception of the army of occupation, only number about 8,000, notwithstanding all the efforts made during the last thirteen years to foster the French colony, often at the expense of the Italians and other foreigners.

Thus, almost every post of patronage under the Bey's Government, even to the "débts de tabac," is now filled by French subjects, the former occupants of foreign origin having been ousted to make way for them.

I hear on good authority that M. Millet, the recently arrived French Resident, has come here with the fixed intention of carrying on this policy to the utmost extremity. He specially intends, if possible, to crush all Italian prosperity, and the inclosed paragraph from the "Dépêche Tunisienne,"* which is the mouthpiece of the views of the Residency, may be looked upon as epitomizing this determination. In the dearth of French colonization, however, and in view of the fact that this, notwithstanding all the efforts to attract it, is steadily diminishing year by year, what is intended to take its place is not so clear, and he may well find that, if he succeeded in destroying foreign industry in the Regency, he may, as was proved in the historical instance of the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, be killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

On the other hand, it must be considered that the Italian Government are using every effort to undermine French, and assert and maintain their own influence here. This they do in every possible way. They spend yearly large sums of money in subventions to schools, hospitals, Chamber of Commerce, &c., and even in guaranteeing the interest on the capital of a railway; it is therefore not surprising that a newly-arrived French Resident, or even the French Government, should view with alarm so powerful a hostile element, and determine to use every means in their power to crush it.

It is generally understood that advantage will be taken of the lapse of the Italian Treaty next year to alter all the fiscal relations of Italy with the Regency; and I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith an extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne,"* hinting at this in an article in which it publishes and comments on the yearly Report of the Italian Chamber of Commerce.

The Italians say that in that case they will claim the resumption of the Capitulations on the ground that these were only given up temporarily and provisionally, and can be renewed again by the Italian Government; it is hardly likely that France will consent to this view of the matter, so that, should it really be put forward and persisted in by the Italian Government, the result may well affect the friendly relations between the two countries.

It is supposed that, on the lapse of the Italian Treaty, France may wish to get rid of our Treaty with Tunis, and, if this intention exist, it is not too much to expect that if it be carried into effect our trade with Tunis, which is beginning to revive from the shock given by the declaration of the Protectorate, will shortly be in the condition to which it has been reduced in Algeria, that is to say, that another market for our produce will be practically destroyed.

Our Treaty is happily in perpetuity; but I notice that a French Deputy, M. Doumer, proposes, after the vote on the Budget has been taken, "to put a question to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the breaking and revision of the Treaties of the Regency with Italy and England," thus coupling those two countries as if their Treaties were in the same category.

I have ventured even thus early to call your Lordship's attention to those matters in view of the importance that they may possibly ere long assume.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

P.S. February 12, 1895.—Just as I was closing the above, I received Sir T. Sanderson's despatch No. 1 to Mr. Profeit of the 1st February, inclosing an extract from a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister in Stockholm (No. 2 of the 9th January), with reference to the recently arrived French Resident.

The views therein expressed would seem forcibly to bear out those attributed to M. Millet here, to which I have had the honour of alluding in the above despatch.

W. H. D. H.

No. 3.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 4.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Tunis, February 6, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Millet, the French Resident, is about to undertake a tour into the interior and to the south of the Regency.

* Not printed.

3

M. Millet is active and intelligent, and is anxious to make himself personally acquainted with the central and outlying districts of the Regency with a view to their development agriculturally, commercially, and politically.

He will be accompanied by a staff composed of the Director of Agriculture, the Director-General of Public Works, the Naval and Military Attachés, one of the Secretaries of Legation, and last, but not least, the Director of the Havas Agency.

I have fortunately, since my arrival, succeeded in establishing very friendly relations with M. Millet, and he has most kindly asked me to join his party.

As this is an opportunity which will probably not occur again of seeing, under the most favourable circumstances, a part of the country which may be of interest to Her Majesty's Government, I have considered it wise to accept the invitation, especially as I have realized that, with my ignorance of Arabic, and in view of the impossibility of procuring a reliable interpreter, it would be very difficult for me to take alone with any very useful result such a journey as that of Mr. Drummond-Hay in 1892, described by him in his Report of the 9th March, 1893.

I have the honour to inclose herewith the copy of our itinerary which the French Residency have kindly given me, as also a rough tracing of the map of the route to be taken,* from which your Lordship will see that the proposed trip would go through practically the whole of the interior of Tunis, and will skirt near the Tripolitan boundary.

Your Lordship will also observe that the objective, both in the case of Mr. Drummond-Hay's journey and that of the Resident, is the Tschott-el-Djerid, the salt desert about which there has been so much discussion as to the possibility of turning it into an inland lake by admitting the sea.

The French Resident has informed me that this idea has now been finally rejected as impossible, owing to the superior level of the land over that of the Mediterranean.

The Resident will, however, go down to this Tschott from the north, and also return to Gabes by another route to that traversed by Mr. Drummond-Hay, so nearly all the country I shall traverse will be fresh ground.

We were, as your Lordship will observe, to have started on the 14th, but the sudden death this morning of one of the members of the party has caused the Resident to defer his departure for some days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 4.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 6, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I this morning returned to Tunis from the tour in the interior on which I accompanied the French Resident, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my despatch No. 4 of the 9th ultimo.

The journey has proved most interesting and instructive, and I propose to give your Lordship an account of it in a separate Report.

During the whole course of the trip I was treated by M. Millet with the greatest kindness and courtesy, and I am in hopes that the intimacy which has necessarily grown up between two fellow travellers, who often shared the same tent in the desert, may prove of value in conducing to the continuance of the good relations happily existing between the French Residency and the English Consulate-General.

At Kef—one of our halts—M. Millet did me the honour of proposing my health at a reception given him by the colonists. I had consequently to return thanks, which I did in a few polite words, which were received with the greatest enthusiasm.

I have the honour to inclose a telegraphic account of that day's proceedings, sent to the "Dépêche Tunisienne" by the reporter of the "Agence Havas," who accompanied us.

Though this report is not quite accurate—notably in as much as I said nothing about "England viewing the work of France here without jealousy"—it gives a fair general idea of my words.

* Not printed.

It would hardly have been worth while to have troubled your Lordship with this matter, save that I have this morning been shown an attack on me in "La Tribuna," an Italian paper published in Rome, (1) for having accompanied the Resident on his journey; (2) for the character of my words on this occasion, which, even as reported in the "Dépêche Tunisienne," will, I venture to hope, be considered by your Lordship as of a harmless nature.

Little importance need be attached to the hostile criticism of "La Tribuna," if, as I am informed is doubtless the case, it is written by the editor of the "Unione," the Italian organ of Tunis, which makes it its business to be in constant and active hostility to the French Protectorate.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" of February 21, 1895.

De Souk-el-Arba au Kef.

Le Kef, le 19 Février, 1895, 9 heures 30 soir.

APRÈS une nuit douteuse, le soleil entame la brume. Les gros nimbus menaçants gagnent les hauteurs et une lumière vaporeuse succède aux opacités funèbres d'hier.

Cavaliers et montures subissent l'influence de cette gâtée renaissante. Notre allure se fait rapide et les 48 kilom. qui séparent Souk-el-Arba du Kef sont franchis en quatre heures.

Pourtant, les chemins sont loin d'être des pistes de parc. Une neige épaisse couvre les champs, les prairies, et les montagnes: le soleil, qui la fond peu à peu, la transforme en une boue grisâtre et compacte.

Mais, qu'importe? Notre entrain ne s'en ressent pas, grâce à la beauté vraiment incomparable du paysage.

Cette première partie du voyage est certainement une des plus admirables choses que nous ayons vues en Tunisie.

De tous côtés dévalent d'immenses tapis de neige. Au nord, la Kroumirie émerge comme sous un suaire et, aussi loin que la vue puisse s'étendre, elle se heurte à une ceinture de montagnes blanches.

Tout à coup, le goum qui accompagne M. le Contrôleur Radenac, venu à la rencontre du Ministre, se déploie au galop, au milieu d'un vallon couvert de neige épaisse.

Rien ne saurait rendre l'impression de ces 1,000 costumes bizarres, mettant sur le névé comme des taches resplendissantes d'azur, de chrôme, et de pourpre.

Au milieu de cette désolation glacée, rien de plus étrange que les silhouettes des cavaliers des Beni-Ghanem, avec leurs immenses bonnets de plumes d'autruche, qui nous donnent la sensation fantastique d'une apparition.

L'Arrivée au Kef.

L'entrée au Kef est de tous points réussie et complète bien cette matinée.

Les troupes sont sous les armes, la population pousse des acclamations.

Le Commandant Racine vient saluer le Résident.

Les musiques jouent à la grande porte de la ville et devant le Contrôle, situé à l'autre extrémité, où se tiennent les habitants du Kef.

Ceux-ci éprouvent une joie véritable de recevoir le Ministre. Tous leurs discours vont bientôt se faire les échos de ces sentiments et témoigner leur reconnaissance pour le haut fonctionnaire qui n'a pas craint d'affronter les frimas et les fatigues d'une route difficile pour se rendre compte des besoins de chacun et tenir la promesse qu'il avait faite.

Les Réceptions.

Le Commandant Racine vient présenter les officiers, auxquels le Ministre adresse une de ces allocutions cordiales dont il a le secret.

Se succèdent ensuite les différents fonctionnaires, la Municipalité, les colonies Française et Italienne, les indigènes, &c.

M. René, en lui présentant notre colonie, prie M. Millet de venir prendre le café que lui offrent, à l'école, les Français du Kef et les étrangers qui ont bien voulu se joindre à eux.

En l'absence du Vice-Président, malade, M. Guiraud prend la parole pour exprimer au Ministre les souhaits de la Municipalité.

Les plus importants sont la réfection des routes et des rues, la création d'un hôpital, l'établissement d'une voie ferrée.

M. Millet répond en rappelant les paroles qu'il adressait hier aux habitants de Souk-el-Arba.

Pour les travaux qui ne sont que d'une utilité absolument locale, il faut d'abord que les intéressés donnent l'exemple de leur bonne volonté et de leur entente, s'ils veulent se créer des titres à la bienveillance de l'État.

Le Gouvernement doit, avant tout, considérer l'ensemble, les améliorations générales qui sont de nature à profiter au Protectorat entier.

Ses ressources, en force vive, s'épuiseront sans profit s'il s'attache à écouter uniquement les demandes particulières.

Néanmoins, s'il vient à se trouver en présence d'efforts réels tendant à réduire au minimum la contribution qu'on lui réclame, il considérera comme un devoir de prêter une assistance réelle et efficace.

Le Kef a été, jusqu'à présent, trop négligé.

Cela s'explique par le passé de la Régence, qui était essentiellement une Puissance maritime.

Mais cette situation défavorable doit cesser.

Déjà, une grande route s'avance, lancée de Tunis. Le mois de Décembre 1896 la verra terminée.

Un chemin de fer s'impose aussi.

Le voyage qu'il vient de faire lui prouve que la nature du sol, hérissé d'obstacles, interdit de chercher la solution vers le nord; il faudra la chercher dans le sud.

Ce sera chez lui une préoccupation constante d'arriver à doter le Kef du cet indispensable engin de civilisation.

Quant à la question de l'hôpital, il s'efforcera de la résoudre aussitôt son retour à Tunis.

Il y a là une situation fâcheuse qu'il veut faire cesser.

Il y avait une nombreuse assemblée à l'école des garçons, où le Ministre est allé prendre le café.

M. René lui a exposé les désirs de la population, qui se confondent, dans leurs grandes lignes, avec ceux de la Municipalité.

M. Millet a répondu, puis il a remercié les étrangers qui avaient bien voulu venir saluer le Représentant de la France.

Il voit en eux des collaborateurs précieux.

La France, d'ailleurs, n'est nullement exclusive. Elle prêterait à tous un appui d'autant plus énergique qu'ils auront accepté plus franchement le Protectorat de la France.

Le Ministre a terminé en portant un toast, dans des termes pleins de cordialité, à M. Haggard, Consul-Général d'Angleterre.

Celui-ci a répliqué dans une improvisation particulièrement heureuse, qui a été interrompue plusieurs fois par les applaudissements.

M. le Consul-Général a rendu hommage à l'œuvre accomplie par la France en Tunisie et dont l'Angleterre n'est nullement jalouse.

D'aucuns voudraient, bien à tort, montrer des rivalités fondamentales entre les deux Grandes Puissances, qui ne rivalisent que sur le terrain de la civilisation.

Se tournant vers le groupe des étrangers, comprenant un certain nombre de Maltais, M. le Consul-Général a ajouté:—

"La réussite de la France s'explique par les hautes qualités de colonisation dont elle a fait preuve et par le choix heureux des Administrateurs qu'elle a envoyés en Tunisie.

"Le passé répond de l'avenir.

"Vous avez à votre tête un homme dont l'activité et le dévouement sont admirables.

"Je ne puis que conseiller à mes compatriotes de se fier à lui et de l'aider loyalement dans son œuvre, que l'Angleterre, croyez-le, suit sans jalousie."

Dans la Ville.

Le café pris, le Ministre a visité pas à pas le Kef, les sources, les citernes, la basilique bysantine, l'église, la caserne, &c.

Au Cercle Militaire.

A 5 heures et demie, grande réception au Cercle Militaire.

Il suffit de dire qu'elle était organisée par M. le Commandant Racine, dont Tunis a gardé un si excellent souvenir, pour vous donner l'assurance que tout s'est passé le mieux du monde.

Le Résident et le Commandant ont échangé des paroles de vive sympathie.

Cette journée, déjà si bien remplie, s'est terminée par une retraite aux flambeaux conduite par la musique du 3^e Bataillon d'Afrique, qui a joué une demi-heure sous les fenêtres du Contrôle.

Hier, à cause de l'heure avancée, j'ai oublié de vous signaler la réception enthousiaste offerte par le colonel de Souk-el-Arba au Ministre, dans la Halle aux Grains, et qui a eu un vif succès.

No. 5.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

AT the close of a dinner given by the French Resident to celebrate his return from his journey, to which were invited all the members of his party, he made a speech in which, at some length and in very flattering terms, he alluded to the pleasure he had derived from my companionship during the trip.

I venture to report this circumstance as indicating a desire on M. Millet's part—one which has, I must say, been borne out in many other respects—to be on friendly terms with Her Majesty's Consulate-General.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 6.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 6 A.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 22, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for your Lordship's information, two copies of the "Journal Officiel Tunisien," containing a Decree classifying the Artillery Arsenal at Bizertia as a military post.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel Tunisien" of March 15, 1895.

Décret du 4 Février, 1893 (9 Chaaban, 1312).

Louanges à Dieu.

NOUS, Ali Pacha Bey, possesseur du Royaume de Tunis,
Vu votre Décret du 2 Septembre, 1886 (5 Hédjé, 1303),
Sur la proposition de notre Ministre de la Guerre, et

Vu l'assentiment du Gouvernement Français, notifié par dépêche du Ministre de la Guerre, en date du 14 Décembre, 1894,

Nous avons pris le Décret suivant:

Article 1^{er}. L'Arsenal d'Artillerie de Bizerte est classé comme poste militaire.

Art. 2. Notre Ministre de la Guerre est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Vu pour promulgation et mise à exécution.

Le Ministre Plénipotentiaire,
Résident-Général de la République Française à Tunis,
(Signé) RENÉ MILLET.

Tunis, le 4 Février, 1895.

No. 7.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that it has been decided to apply the conscription, which has hitherto only been levied in the northern and central districts of Tunis, to those in the south and on the frontier; at all events, to most of them.

These have hitherto been free from enforced military service, as it was thought better to reserve what was likely to be an unpopular measure until the more turbulent and less approachable tribes should have become accustomed to the French domination.

On the occasion of his late journey, on which I accompanied M. Millet, his announcement of this decision at two places in the mountains—one the Troglodyte town of Gaber-Mukt-Mater, the other the curious town in the very inaccessible gorge of Toujane—was very badly received. At the latter place there was an angry outcry, which was met by the Resident-General reminding the natives that they had been brought to order, "à coups de canon." This provoked a perfect outburst of yells, and the Resident was furiously hooted as we rode away.

He told me that the extension of the conscription would not affect the number of troops, as the percentage on the population would be reduced.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 8.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 15, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Resident-General has stated to me that the raising of the rank of the Officer Commanding the troops here to that of General of Division, and the appointment of a Brigadier-General, who arrived here at the end of January, will not cause any increase in the number of troops in the Regency.

He told me that the change was due to two causes: the one, that General Loclere was a very efficient and popular officer, who was, moreover, an intimate friend of a leading military authority in Paris, and that, as he was nearing the age at which he would have been forcibly retired, unless he gained his step, the place was made for him. I presume, therefore, that a General of Division must, according to French rules, have a General Officer of inferior rank under him.

The other reason was so as to give Tunis a voice in the Algerian Military Board or Council.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 9.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

I VENTURE to send your Lordship a number of the "*Petite Tunisie*,"* a French paper published here.

The malignancy of the attacks on the French Resident, with which it is filled, will show your Lordship that M. Millet's place is anything but a bed of roses.

He has only been here four months, but his actions and plans already meet with violent opposition on the part of many of his countrymen, and, of the four French papers published here, only one, the "*Dépêche Tunisienne*," the mouthpiece of the Residency, consistently supports him; another criticises him fairly impartially; the other two load him with abuse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 10.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

THE Resident-General informs me that the number of troops of all arms of the Service in Tunis amounts to about 12,000. These are chiefly composed of the Régiments d'Afrique—the "*Joyeux*," as they are familiarly called. These are made up of drafts from other regiments of men convicted of theft, or of "*attentats à la pudeur*."

In addition to these there is a battalion called the "*bataillon disciplinaire*," composed of men of all branches of the Service who have constantly committed offences against discipline; recalcitrant men, in fact, who are hopeless. These are sent to the most desolate frontier forts, and present a somewhat sad appearance, dressed in a sort of dirty coloured khaki suit, and wearing a cap with an enormous peak half covering their faces. Their officers told me that this treatment and its accompanying discipline is very efficacious, and that they have not much trouble with them.

A battery of artillery, and from 400 to 500 men have been sent to Madagascar, as well as 300 mules, and the officers complain that, if any movement of troops were to be made here, the force would be inconvenienced.

Of this we had practical proof during the Resident's late journey, as the teams of mules belonging to a break which accompanied us until we reached the mountains, for the benefit of those members of our party who did not care to ride, having been sent to Madagascar, those provided to replace them were untrained, and on one occasion they struck work in the middle of the Grout Tschott-el-Djerid in a somewhat critical position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 11.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 17, 1895.

YOUR Lordship is aware that the French govern this country by a system of Departments, each under a Contrôleur, who is also nominally a Vice-Consul. This officer is in direct communication with the Home Department of the Central Government here, which is under the direction of a Frenchman—M. Roy.

* Not printed.

To this Department the Contrôleur suggests the appointment of the different native Kaidés of the towns and villages in his district, who only hold their appointments, therefore, at the good-will of the French authorities.

The French domination is therefore complete, as the Bey has absolutely no authority or voice in the appointment of even the lowest office in the country.

Hitherto the Contrôleurs of the north and central districts have been civilians, those of the frontier and south the military officers in charge of the various posts. It has been, however, latterly thought advisable to gradually replace these soldiers by civilians, as the country showed no sign of disturbance.

The present Resident-General is, however, very averse to this change, and told me that he not only was not in favour of it, but that he would, if possible, fill up all the Contrôles throughout the Regency with officers, either seconded from their regiments, or who had retired from active service.

His view is that their military discipline stands them in good stead in governing the natives, that they are, in fact, "stronger" men than civilians, especially as these have had no special training for the work of administration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 12.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 6th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that on the various occasions on which the Resident-General addressed the Italian colonists who assembled to meet him at the towns we passed through at the beginning of our journey, he always impressed upon them the necessity of submitting themselves to French Regulations and assimilating themselves to French habits and thought. "*Apprenez à aimer les Français*," he said on one occasion. On this condition he promised them the protection and "*bienveillance*" of the Government.

I had various conversations with M. Millet on this subject, and ventured to point out to him that whatever railroads he made, whatever forests he planted, whatever plains he drained, whatever deserts he irrigated, all would be useless if he could not attract a population—that it seemed hopeless to expect French peasants to come in sufficient numbers to give "*mains d'œuvre*," and that, as far as one could see, in the absence of Chinese, there only remained Italians.

To this view he assented, and said that he would welcome Italians here, but on condition that they became French, at least in the second generation.

It remains to be seen how the treatment they have hitherto received, and that which the future may have in store for them, will be of such a character as to inspire them with the love of France which is preached to them, to the extent of inducing them to adopt French nationality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 13.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 18, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Resident-General has informed me that he intends to do away with the tobacco and salt monopolies.

Those press with great severity on the population and bring about the most absurd results. A great quantity of the land here is admirably suited for tobacco culture, but it is forbidden, and the farmer, if a farmer, has actually to buy the inferior imported tobacco at the "*débite de tabac*."

The salt tax is still more glaring. There are enormous stores of salt in this country, but it is forbidden to gather it. The great "Tschotts" are vast natural salt pans extending for hundreds of square miles; the salt cannot be used, and I found the other day on our journey, when we crossed the great "Tschott-el-Djerid," that the inhabitants living on its border were actually forbidden to gather enough salt from it, even for their own consumption.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 14.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 19, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 6th February last, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Resident-General has told me that he hopes to establish a sort of "Sonderbund" between France and Tunis.

To do this would of course entail the revision of the existing Treaties between the Regency and foreign Powers. That this will be done M. Millet apparently takes for granted, as, on one occasion during our late journey, I heard him say, "When we have revised the Treaties we will do so and so."

It may be assumed that the wish is father to the thought. He has never said anything to me about our Treaty, and if he does, without instructions from your Lordship to the contrary, I shall give him no hope that his scheme will be realized, which would, without some adequate *quid pro quo*, entail loss to English interests.

Meanwhile, the intention meets with considerable opposition even from the French here, as it would entail taxation from which they are now exempt; and I observed in a French paper the other day an appeal to the sanctity of those Treaties as rendering M. Millet's scheme impracticable. The French have also, as your Lordship is aware, a Treaty with Tunis not unlike our own.

Our import trade is larger than that of Italy, and consists chiefly of Manchester goods, which would, as in Algeria, doubtless be submitted to an absolutely prohibitive duty if our Treaty were not in existence.

It is a matter of considerable surprise to me that English manufacturers have not taken more advantage of the lenient treatment which we at present enjoy, which enables them to compete with their superior goods on equal terms as regards duties with French manufacturers. As a matter of fact, our goods are not properly represented here, and I cannot but think that if the Chambers of Commerce in England were to occupy themselves a little as regards this matter, the market here might be very largely increased.

Up to the last year or two English goods were greatly handicapped by the difficulties and expense of transit, but now there is a direct line of steamers running fortnightly from Manchester (the "Prince" line). This Company ran a line of steamers monthly from London to Tunis till the close of last year, when they had to take it off as it did not pay. They now run direct from London to Malta, with transshipment there to Tunis.

Perhaps if these facts were generally known more English goods would be brought here. It seems to me that, with the present difficulty of finding markets, the English manufacturer would do well to try and compete with the French, which I am inclined to think that he could, under present circumstances, do with success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 15.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 20, 1895.

DURING my late journey with the Resident-General I had great opportunity of observing his character and ascertaining his views.

There is no doubt that he is a very clever man, as well as full of energy and determination. He is a thorough political economist, and has, indeed, written on that subject with great ability. He is anxious, therefore, to apply to the administration of Tunis the views which he has propounded.

These are doubtless sound in theory, and the advice which he gave in the various speeches which I heard him make was admirably sensible and clear.

He sees the wants of the country, and thinks that he can apply the remedies. These are, of course, chiefly the abolition of monopolies, of taxes on production and export, the draining of marshes, the irrigation of deserts, and the improvement of communication by road and rail. He intends to do his very best for the country, will spare himself in no way, and has a great, possibly an exaggerated, idea of the importance of the task he has before him.

But this is a difficult task. Wedded as the Frenchman naturally is to a vicious system of taxation, M. Millet's lessons will meet with great opposition, and where will he find the wherewithal to make up the deficiencies in the revenue caused by the abolition of the present direct taxes? This is one of the problems which he will have to solve. Meanwhile, his views have raised a storm of abuse, and it remains to be seen whether he can weather it, or whether it will overwhelm him and he will be hooted out of the Regency, the fate which befell his predecessors.

He is, perhaps, somewhat wanting in temper and judgment, and is, I think, far too unguarded in his speech. A masterful man, nervous and excitable, he does not care to "ménager" his opponents, but rather irritates than conciliates, and will, doubtless, when the time comes, attempt to crush them. Previous experience here would tend to show that, with the present system of government in France, he will find this a task beyond his powers.

Meanwhile, he is an intimate friend of M. Hanotaux, and, as long as he is in power, probably all will be well with M. Millet.

He promises very readily, and the moment may come when he will find arrayed against him not only the opponents to his views, but also those who are disappointed at his not having been able to effect all the reforms and benefits which he has undertaken.

I was astonished to find how much had already been done, chiefly as regards railways and roads, in the Regency. Fortunately, the country generally offers no natural difficulties; sometimes for 100 kilom. one rode across the desert on a natural track as good as a turnpike road. But the Arabs do not care for roads, they do not want them for their camels and asses, and, as yet, there is practically no European population to use them.

Railroads are being made at the rate of 100 kilom. a-year, and it speaks well for the careful administration of the finances that, even with the vicious system of taxation prevailing, this is done from the ordinary Budget, and that an annual surplus still remains; it may be judged how their income might be improved under a better system of taxation. To give an instance of the system now in vogue, I may mention that the four oases of the Djerid, El Oudjene Nefta, Tozeur, and El Hemma—which only amount to 2,500 hectares—supporting a population of about 8,000 inhabitants, pay taxes at so much a date palm, varying, according to the quality of the palm, amounting to 600,000 fr. per annum.

A premium is thus set, not on cultivation, but on neglect and idleness, for the better the palm the more it pays, the more a man plants the more he is mulcted. The last mentioned, El Hemma, is now deserted, owing to the inability of the inhabitants to pay the taxes.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 20, 1895.

DURING the course of my late journey in the interior and south with the Resident-General, I took advantage of every opportunity which presented itself of acquiring information with reference to French intentions as regards questions connected with their frontier and the "Hinterland."

Commandant Rebillet, the Military Attaché to the Residency, who, it is not too much to say, has for years had the direction of the Tripoli frontier question, accompanied us, and I had various conversations with him on the subject. Unfortunately a fall at Gafsa prevented his accompanying us further to the south, and I thereby lost a good chance of becoming as thoroughly acquainted with the state of affairs there as I otherwise perhaps should have been, as I had to a great extent reserved my communications with him on these matters until our being near the spot would give me better opportunities of displaying an interest in the matter.

This was unlucky, as M. Rebillet did not seem at all averse to imparting information. I must say, indeed, that reticence seems to form no part of the training of the French Colonial official, and other gentlemen whom I was with showed no desire to conceal anything they knew.

On one occasion the Resident-General was looking at a map of Tunis. I asked him to explain the frontier to me. When we came to the south he pointed out the Mokhta, "Rut," I inquired, "where does it go to after that?" He drew his finger for a long way pretty well due south from Tozeur. "Is that the frontier of Tunis?" I asked. "Nous préférons laisser cela dans le vague," he replied; "nous ne voulons pas permettre aux Turcs de nous opposer une barrière entre nous et le Soudan." On one occasion I heard him say, "Quand nous aurons le Soudan."

I see the French military map of 1880 draws the Tunisian frontier just north of Ghadames, but I gathered generally that the French were not disposed to consider Turkish proprietorship of that important communication as interfering with any schemes which they may have.

At Tozeur, M. Pellier, a French officer who has lived as forest ranger for many years in the regions round the Tschott-el-Djerid, and who is considered a great authority on these questions, told me that that the scheme is to make a railroad down to Ghadames and thence to connect this with one which is now being made from Senegal in the direction of Lake Tchad at the rate of 100 kilom. a-year by the French military authorities. He added that it was not settled from what point the railroad was to start on this side, but that Ghadames was the objective from both sides.

This scheme would seem to be somewhat mild, at all events for the present, and I only quote M. Pellier's statement as showing the tendency of French thought and design.

At one of the frontier stations our party was joined by a man named Gadour. His father was a Piedmontese, and his mother an Arab, to the latter of which races he prefers to belong. He is an interpreter, attached to the French frontier force at Kebelli. He told me that he had in 1891 gone under orders, bearing the fictitious name of "Abd-el-Kader," to explore the route to Ghadames. He underwent the operation of circumcision previously, so as to be a Mohammedan in every sense. It being the summer, he did not go by the direct caravan road from Dous by Tataouin, as there would have been a difficulty in getting water, so he followed the route by Nahout over Sinaoua.

The journey took sixteen days. He found water all the way to Sinaoua, but had to carry it thence two and a-half days to Ghadames. He described Ghadames as a town of only about 4,000 inhabitants, but as a great centre of caravan trade. During the whole time that he was there there was a constant arrival and departure of caravans. It would seem likely, therefore, that the primary object of the French movements in this direction is to tap this reservoir of trade, much of which is now directed south into the desert and smuggled further west across the Algerian frontier.

After leaving Ghadames, where he was undiscovered, he went to Tataouin, Bornou, Wadai, and Lake Tchad, when he was betrayed as a French Agent and taken in chains to Tripoli, where he was released by the Dey at the instigation of the French Consul-General.

He says that, save that he was chained on the way, and imprisoned at Tripoli, he met with no ill-treatment. He added that he did not intend to take any more of these journeys, and that lately, since two French officers who came from Algiers to Ghadames, which they were refused permission to enter, there had been no fresh explorations made in these regions.

I heard a great deal about Cornes, the nominal Swiss but supposed French spy, who is mentioned in Mr. Drummond-Hay's report sent home in his despatch No. 18 of the 15th February. It appears that Cornes is really a Swiss, formerly a professor of mathematics at a Swiss University—I think Zurich. He is an eccentric being who was so bitten by the love of Arab life that he devoted himself to desert travelling and sport, and his scientific knowledge enabled him to take most complete maps, all of which he gave to the French officers, so they are in possession of a great deal of valuable information which he collected.

He was, otherwise, nearly off his head, and, having turned Mahomedan and married an Arab wife, he went completely mad. He was sent back to Europe, but has now recovered, and it is possible that he may return. He got into Ghadames draped and veiled as a woman, and though he does not know Arabic well, he thus passed undiscovered.

Captain Cointin, one of the officers by whom we were met, is in charge of the mountainous district between Dous and the sea, including Toujane.

He gave the Resident some of his experiences, among which was that of having been reprimanded and recalled by one of the former Residents for showing too much activity, i.e., for aggressions on the Tripolitan tribes.

On this M. Millet said: "Le plus loin que vous poussez, le plus je vous considérerai. Vous pouvez faire savoir cela à tout le monde."

From this speech it may be judged what line M. Millet is likely to take if he gets the chance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 2.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

Tunis, March 25, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a cutting from the "Dépêche Tunisienne," detailing all the expenses incurred by France for her Protectorate here for and since the occupation.

The army expenses from 1861 to 1893 are estimated at 116,898,176 fr. and it is calculated that to this sum must be added another 100,000,000 fr. for the ordinary expenses of the army during that time. As a Government paper the "Dépêche" is not likely to increase the estimate of the expenses. It may be supposed that 216,898,176 fr. is at least not over the mark. The sum incurred in military expenses since 1855 to the close of last year is calculated at 97,330,189 fr. To this is added 12,968,820 fr. for naval expenses; 42,160,000 fr. for guarantees of interest on the Medjerda line; 2,622,100 fr. for Diplomatic and Consular expenses; 2,336,626 fr. for posts and telegraphs; 1,478,600 fr. for army expenses borne by the Financial Department; 120,000 fr.—an allowance to the Délégué or Secretary of Legation; 26,358 fr. spent by the Minister of Agriculture for an Exhibition, making the expense of Tunis to France altogether to amount to a grand total of 376,940,959 fr., or 15,037,639l.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 17.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" of March 20, 1895.

IL peut être intéressant de connaître le montant total des sacrifices que la France s'est imposés pour la Tunisie depuis 1881.

Ce total ne peut malheureusement pas être calculé avec une grande précision, car les dépenses militaires de la Tunisie, dans les premières années, ne sont pas entièrement

Ces dépenses réelles ont été les suivantes : —

Ces dépenses réelles ont été les suivantes : —

Les dépenses totales d'entretien des troupes d'occupation après 1885 sont les suivantes:—

Les dépenses totales d'entretien des troupes d'occupation après 1885 sont les suivantes:—

Long short-term memory (LSTM) networks

4. 1994 年 12 月 31 日 至 1995 年 12 月 31 日 期间 在 本 公 司 工 作 的 人 员 中 有 无 违 反 公 司 的 纪 律 或 有 违 反 中 国 法 律 的 行 为 的 人 员 ？ 如 有 违 反 公 司 纪 律 或 有 违 反 中 国 法 律 的 行 为 的 人 员 ？ 如 有 违 反 公 司 纪 律 或 有 违 反 中 国 法 律 的 行 为 的 人 员 ？

Cette somme représente, sous la réserve des déductions opérées dans le premier exercice de l'impôt foncier sur la valeur cadastrale des propriétés, le montant de la contribution à la France depuis notre prise de possession du pays en 1881 jusqu'au 31 Décembre, 1894.

Les dépenses de la marine ont été pendant la période des opérations militaires—

Les années suivantes les dépenses de la marine étaient réduites aux chiffres que voici :—

Somme à laquelle il faut ajouter les dépenses de guerre données ci-dessus, soit :

Les dépenses imputées sur le budget du Ministère des Travaux Publics pour la garantie d'intérêts aux chemins de fer Transports Agés de la Monnaie, datée de 1878.

* Pour les années 1988 et suivantes, les comptes n'ont pas encore été arrêtés définitivement par l'Administration.

Les dépenses faites pour la Tunisie sur le budget du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, par ordre d'importance, d'après les indications que nous avons données précédemment :—

Les dépenses du service postal et télégraphique, à raison de 179,740 fr 50 c. par an pendant treize ans, peuvent être évaluées à 2,356,620 fr.

Les dépenses de trésorerie d'armée imputées sur le budget du Ministère des Finances, peuvent être évaluées de même à 1,475,000 fr.

L'indemnité de 10,000 fr au Délégué auprès du Résident-Général de France à Tunis pour représentation de l'Etat français devant la Régence a été inscrite au budget de l'Instruction Publique depuis 1893. Soit douze années à 10,000 fr., 120,000 fr.

Le Ministère de l'Agriculture a fait pour la Tunisie, lors du concours agricole de Tunis en 1888, une dépense de 23,808 fr., et une autre de 550 fr. en 1888; en tout,

sauf quelques erreurs de peu d'importance ou quelques omissions, l'ensemble des charges supportées par le Budget Français pour la Tunisie

Elles peuvent être résumées dans les chiffres suivants :—

Soit donc, au 31 Décembre, 1891, une charge totale pour le Budget Français, du fait du Protectorat Tunisien, de 275 millions environ non compris une centaine de millions de dépenses militaires ordinaires, faites de 1881 à 1885.

No. 18.

Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 30.)

No. 142.)

(Telegraph.) P.

Constantinople, April 20, 1895, 8 P.M.

The Italian Government have sent instructions to the Ambassador here to call the attention of the Grand Vizier to the rumoured intended occupation of Zuara, near Tripoli, by the French.

M. Catalani is also about to urge upon the Turkish Government that the French should be pressed to come to an agreement respecting the delimitation of the Tripoli Hinterland.

In case my support is requested by my Italian colleague, I have the honour to ask for your Lordship's instructions as to whether I should afford it in either or both of these representations.

No. 19.

The Earl of Kimberley to Sir P. Currie.

(Africa.)

(Telegraph.) P.

Foreign Office, April 23, 1895.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 142 of the 20th instant, you may carry out the instructions contained in the final paragraph of my despatch No. 517 of the 22nd October, and support your Italian colleague. Lord Salisbury's statement to Rustem Pasha of the 19th November, 1890, that the Turkish claim to Bornu could not be admitted, should, however, be borne in mind.

No. 20.

Mr. Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, April 9, 1895.

I HAVE, in my previous despatches, No. 3, Confidential, of the 6th February, and No. 16 of the 19th March, had the honour of alluding to the subject of the Treaties existing between Tunis and England and Italy respectively, and the wish of the French Resident-General to see them abrogated with the view of instituting a "libre échange" with France, the result of which would inevitably be the destruction of the trade of other countries.

I have now to send you a copy and translation (by Mr. Perrot) of an article which has lately appeared in the "Union," copied from an Italian paper, which represents the matter in a light which I have ventured to think might prove of interest to your Lordship.

I have had a conversation on the subject with Signor Machiavelli, the Italian Agent and Consul-General. He tells me that the statements in the article are absolutely correct. He was good enough to show me a copy of the Protocol drawn up between the Italian and Beylical Governments on the occasion of the suspension (a term on the full force of which he insisted) of the Consular jurisdiction. In this occur the following sentences:—

"Le Gouvernement du Roi consent . . . à suspendre en Tunisie l'exercice de la Jurisdiction des Tribunaux Consulaires Italiens. . . . Sauf cette dérogation du régime actuel il est expressément convenu que toutes les autres immunités, avantages, et garanties assurés dans les Capitulations, les usages, et les Traités restent en vigueur."

He says that when, therefore, their Treaty with Tunis lapses next year, they will fall back upon the "Capitulations" in virtue of which they enjoy most favoured nation privileges—that, therefore, as long as our Treaty is in existence, Italy, and indeed all other nations which have no Treaty, will be perfectly safe.

It will appear therefore as the "Union" states, that the whole question, not only of the trade of Tunis with Italy, but also of her trade with Austria-Hungary,

Germany, and many other countries of Europe and America, depends on the maintenance of our Treaty.

The danger therefore, attached by France on the one hand to its abrogation, and on the other, to its maintenance, lies at their head, to its maintenance, will react in the future on the future commercial and fiscal relations of Tunis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Extract from "L'Union" of April 4, 1895.

(Translation.)

THE larger commercial and economical questions of Italy cannot be separated from the Treaty of Commerce between Italy and the Regency of Tunis (falla next year).

Many believe, and perhaps not without reason, that France, as Protector of the Bey, will prevent its renewal, and foresee therein a fresh check to our enterprise already almost paralysed in the Mediterranean.

Upon our position, which will be determined in the event of the Treaty falling, depends a number of questions of a political and international character, which it may not be inopportune to touch upon now, though we reserve to ourselves the right to develop them at greater length on a future occasion.

First of all the question must be asked: If Italy remains without a Treaty what will be the conditions under which, looked at from the point of view of the Customs, relations will be carried on with Tunis. Will she remain in such an inferior position as to see herself deprived of every possibility of maintaining the competition with other nations?

We do not believe so. All must, therefore, remember, with pleasure, that the "Capitulations" still exist in Tunis. It is true that the Consular jurisdiction was suspended as an experiment, but the "Capitulations," especially as far as they secure equality of treatment for all Europeans, are still in full vigour.

Consequently, the French Government cannot, in the name of the Capitulations, perpetrate in the sense that it cannot be departed from without the consent of both parties—it is evident that Italy, in virtue of these very "Capitulations," has the right to call to her aid this equality of treatment, and to take advantage of the clause which favours English commerce for the introduction of her own produce into the Regency.

To prove the exactitude of this affirmation it is sufficient to cite here a fact which Europe and America have no Treaties with Tunis. Nevertheless the duties paid by these countries, when passing their goods through the Customs, do not in any way differ from those paid by Italy and England, although they have special Treaties.

Should our Treaty fall and England's remain it is therefore clear that the treatment which is now conceded to Austria, Germany, Russia, America, &c., cannot be denied to us. Any other burden which it may be desired to impose upon us would be unjust, odious, and, moreover, unacceptable. It would constitute an exception for our disadvantage; it would be sufficient to announce it in order to have it annulled.

If then the Councilors of the Bey intend—in order to avoid this exception—to extend the burden to all the others except England, favoured as this country is by its Treaty, and France, Protector of Tunis, we shall be in good company for proving our arguments, and for the surety of seeing them triumph.

It is not now, however, the moment to discuss them. It is sufficient to call the attention of our Government to the matter, so that it may foresee in time all the eventualities which may arise in connection with the subject under discussion.

That it must do so with serenity of mind, mature design, and exact appreciation of the grave interests at stake, there is no necessity to point out. The matter is one which naturally calls for treatment, as it is natural to suppose that there will be no lack of difficulties put in our way on the part of those who have every interest in creating a fresh barrier to our commercial and maritime expansion on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean.

(No. 25.)

Texas, April 26, 1895.

The author of this article would appear to be well acquainted with the subject he writes about.

inclosure in No. 21

References

[illegible]

The arrival is announced for the beginning of June of five torpedoes, which will probably be used for the construction of submarine mines, and the establishment of torpedoes capable of control. In a short time, almost without any

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Tulär, May 7, 1895.

It would seem that we ought to be the gainers commercially by any such efforts, if successful.

It would appear, therefore, that the more the French open up communications with the interior, the more important is it both that our Treaty with Tunis should be altered, and that British manufacturers should be encouraged to make use of this country as a pipe through which gradually to pour their produce into the French sphere of influence, and thus through the whole of North and Central Africa. This would turn into a real advantage to England a scheme which has presumably not that amiable intention.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

No. 23.

No. 28. Confidential 1

Tyler, May 9, 1895.

guarded, and I had no opportunity, such as had Lord Methven, as reported in my despatch No. 5 of the 14th February, of seeing any part of it save the outside. This sufficed, however, to show me that it was a very strong work towards the sea, though liable to capture from the rear or land side.

The fort of Monte Negro is situated at some distance on the other side of the harbour on the crest of a much more considerable rise. It is not finished, and there are still numbers of men at work on it. It is similar in construction with, but, I think, larger than the Fort d'Espagne. This is probably owing to the fact that accommodation had to be provided for the garrison, which, in the case of the Fort d'Espagne, can be found in the old castle close by. The armament is, I was told, identical in both forts. It appeared to me that in Monte Negro it consisted of four heavy and four quick-firing guns, the former in position, the latter on swivels with screens. They are at present all visible from the rear, but already quite hidden from the front. There is a ditch in the rear and on the flanks, but none in front; it is thus identical in this respect with the Fort d'Espagne. In the interior is a courtyard with a wall of masonry, which is pierced by a vaulted passage leading to the front. The internal side of the ditch is faced with masonry.

Would it be advisable to make representations in view of possibility of his taking advantage of position to revenge himself on British subjects?
The Commissary of Police having resigned to show his resignation it is said that the only way is at this moment acting as Commissary, and that he is not to be removed from him. This I do not guarantee.

No. 28.

The Earl of Kimberley to Consul-General Haggard.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 18, 1895, 8 P.M.

YOUR telegram of yesterday.
Can you mention the matter unofficially to the Resident, and report result by telegram?

No. 29.

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 19, 5:15 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tunis, June 19, 1895, 3:10 P.M.

Yr. P. Embassy's telegram of yesterday.
Resident resented remark somewhat, but finally said that appointment was provisional "du jour" and that he will not be appointed Commissary.
I have only mixed functions, and that he will not be appointed Commissary.
Please wait for despatch.

No. 30.

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, June 14, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a cutting from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" which is as your Lordship is aware the only French newspaper of the French Residency.

The despatch I have had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship the other day is the result of the negotiations with France, which is here attached to.

It may be remarked, with reference to the penultimate paragraph bearing the declaration of M. Ribot in the French Chamber in 1890, that "l'administration tunisienne ne saurait être proposée comme une administration française." This is the only declaration which is not in the terms of the treaty of the Bardo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

P.S.—In the official "Guide Annuaire" of Tunis the first item in the "Partie Politique" is the Treaty of the Bardo.

In the actual Treaty, the concluding paragraph of the IInd Article is as follows:

"Cette disposition cessera d'être applicable lorsque les autorités administratives françaises et tunisiennes auront reconnu, d'un commun accord, que l'Administration locale est en état de garantir le maintien de l'ordre."

The French do not stick at trifles, and in the version given by the "Annuaire" this important clause is completely left out, and I am assured that this is by no means an isolated instance.

W. H. D. H.

No. 29*.

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, June 7, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 28 of the 1st May, I have the honour to inclose herewith two paragraphs from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" the semi-official mouthpiece of the Residency—on the subject of the proposed line from the north into the Soudan.

I have no knowledge of the scheme having made sufficient progress to make the dispute as to the route for the future line to follow other than academic for the moment. However, the announcement in connection with this subject of General Allegro's preparation of an expedition to pass in the autumn by the Tunisian Tripoli frontier into the Soudan is interesting, and the latter may be worth watching. General Allegro is the strongest advocate of the scheme, and it is not known the French may be said to owe as much as, and perhaps more than to anything else, their presence here to-day.

General Allegro is incapacitated by blindness from personal action now, but when I saw him he was then in the back of his head, and still in the back of his head to be capable of forming again any such iniquitous plan as the "chasse aux Khamirs" (Kroumirs) if it were made worth his while.

He is for the moment enjoying a well-earned repose as Governor of Gabès.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29*.

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of June 7, 1895.

LA pénétration du Soudan et M. Napoléon Ney:

Dans la séance du 24 Mai dernier de la Société d'Economie Industrielle et Commerciale, M. Napoléon Ney a fait une communication, qu'il importe de relever.

Après avoir exposé les tentatives de pénétration, il n'a pas encore été question de la Tunisie. Il suffit, cependant, ajoute-t-il, "de jeter un coup d'œil sur la carte de ce pays pour voir que la route du Soudan par Gabès est plus aisée que par toute autre route. Il s'agit donc d'ouvrir, ou plutôt de rouvrir au commerce Européen la route du Soudan vers Gabès par la ligne Gabès-Ghadamès-Kano, &c."

C'est ce que la "Dépêche Tunisienne," dans son numéro du 30 Avril dernier, reproduisant un article de la "Revue de l'Institut de Carthage," a dit avant M. Napoléon Ney.

Après ces prémisses, on s'attend à voir préconiser le projet d'une voie ferrée partant de Gabès dans la direction Ghadamès et Kano. Ce serait logique, et c'est la ligne demandée par la "Dépêche" et par l'auteur de l'article qu'elle reproduisait.

Mais M. Ney ne s'arrête pas là. Il ajoute: "Après la route qui semble s'imposer tout naturellement, il en préconise une autre: celle de Biskra-Ouargla."

Ne s'agit-il pas fort bien de l'avis de M. Georges Bonin, le sympathique ingénieur qui a tant fait pour multiplier et faire pousser ses palmiers de l'Oued Rhir, soit heureux de pousser à la création d'un chemin de fer qui doublerait la valeur des propriétés de son ami; mais ce que nous comprenons moins, c'est ce que la Tunisie, le point de Gabès en particulier, le plus rapproché cependant du Soudan, celui par lequel la pénétration dans l'intérieur est plus aisée que par toute autre route, ont à gagner à cette voie Biskra-Ouargla.

Pour notre part, nous protestons contre cet itinéraire qui, beaucoup plus coûteux qu'un chemin de fer, serait tout de même des services. Nous trouvons cela

[illegible]

Inclosure 3 in No. 894.

Extract from the "Dépêche Tennesse" of June 6, 1895

Paris, le 8 Juin, 1890, 7 h. 40 m.
LE Général Allegro prépare à Paris l'organisation d'une cavalerie destinée à
partir en mission de la France à l'étranger pour garder les routes.

Incloture in No. 30.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tennesse" of June 18, 1895.

LE 12 JAN, 1890. Il n'est pas sans intérêt, au moment où les corps élus, où l'opinion publique se prononcent de plus en plus pour une Union Douanière complète avec la France à des progrès accomplis en 18 ans sont tenus par peur de chose à côté de ceux qui leur tiennent pour responsables la lenteur et le retard au coup tant en arrière et de se reporter à l'époque de nos luttes pour obtenir cette Loi Douanière dont on nous mesure les tranches avec tant de parcimonie encore aujourd'hui.

C'était le 10 Juin, 1890; la Commission des Douanes se réunissait sous la présidence de M. Méline pour examiner les différents Articles du projet Douanier Franco-Tunisien. Celui-ci était près de passer lorsque M. Thomson, par une de ces manœuvres dont il est coutumier, réunissait à le faire renvoyer au Gouvernement afin d'y introduire la clause de la réciprocité dans les échanges entre la France et la Tunisie. Cette clause, on le savait bien, était impossible à appliquer en l'état des Travaux conclus entre la France et les Turcs. L'assaillant, M. le Député de Constantinople, feignait de l'ignorer, et après lui M. Marty, Député de l'Aude, qui craignait pour les vins de son arrondissement.

Malgré l'intelligente intervention de M. Sarrion, Député du Saône-et-Loire, qui faisait observer que l'exigence de M. Thomson tendait en fait à refuser à la Tunisie le traitement de faveur qu'on prétendait lui accorder, le renvoi au Gouvernement l'emportait d'une voix (14 contre 13).

... suite d'un point, la Tunisie allait-elle perdre son Traité ?

La presse, heureusement, où notre Résident-Général, M. Mamicault, comptait tant d'amis, protesta, les deux jours suivants, avec ensemble : le "Temps" disait de la motion M. Thomson que c'était un modèle de myatification élégante ; le "Journal des Débats," "La Lanterne," "La France," "l'Autorité," et "l'Estafette," ne ménageaient pas leur bâton.

symptomatique de l'état des esprits à cette époque : à la Chambre, la question de l'abandon de la Tunisie était soulevée par M. Ponton, ancien Président du Tribunal de Tunis, qui déclarait qu'en présence de l'hostilité de l'Algérie, mieux vaudrait peut-être abandonner la Régence que de la laisser nos nationaux sans protection.

M. Ribot protestait aussitôt et déclarait, aux applaudissements du Parlement qui commençait à se ressaisir, que "l'abandon de la Tunisie ne saurait être proposé, même indirectement, dans une Chambre Française".

De fait, la proposition Pontois était enterrée par 438 voix contre 38.

No. 31

Consul-General Huggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Texas, June 14, 1895.

IN my despatches Nos. 28 and 31 of the 9th and 21st May, I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention to the difficulty and danger attending the entry of the port of Bizerta by large ships.

When the Italian newspaper here sounded a pean because the Captain of the "Touraine," a ship belonging to the Messageries Maritimes, had deemed it safer to "bear the life he had" outside in the roadstead rather than to "fly to others that he knew not of" inside the harbour, it was rebuked by its French semi-official contemporary, the "Dépêche Tunisienne," who bade it wait till the French fleet arrived, when it would be seen steaming majestically up the Canal.

Well, the French fleet has been and gone, but that splendid sight has not been seen, for the Admiral, like the Captain of the "Touraine," considering that prudence was the determining factor, sent only the torpedo-boats and one or two of the smaller ships, the largest of which was the "Iphigénie," a training-ship measuring 3,300 tons.

Incls are in No. 31

Extract from the "Petite Tribune" of June 14, 1896.

POUR rendre le port de Bizerte accessible à nos cuirassés, il reste encore à faire sauter quelques milliers de mètres cubes de rochers qui se trouvent devant le port de Bizerte, à l'embouchure du lac de St. Pierre. Les ingénieurs de la marine ont fait appel à l'intelligence des ingénieurs, et ils ont trouvé la solution.

Vol. 32

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 40, Confidential.)

My Lord,

THE Inclosed article from the "Tribune" of the 17th inst. is a very fair and accurate representation of the views of the "Tribune" on the subject of the M. T. Convention. It is a very good example of the kind of journalism which the "Tribune" is capable of. It is a very good example of the kind of journalism which the "Tribune" is capable of. It is a very good example of the kind of journalism which the "Tribune" is capable of.

This would not apply to the more serious matter of the "cooked" in various ways to a great extent, so as to make articles are really French. I have been assured, on what I consider a respectable authority, that the officials at Lyons, that comes in a French of our of our that in the year 1914, the value of our goods, and as to the erroneous Returns apply to a certain extent also to Austrian and German goods.

I think there is every reason to hope that the world will be able to give it up should be at once of a tangible

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

No. 53

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 41 Confidential)

My Lord.

On the 7th, I directed your Lordship's attention to the likelihood of the French authorities showing a certain activity on the coast of Tunis, June 17, 1895.

* Not printed.

I stated in my first message despatched to express the view that the first apparent object of the French was to ~~keep the hand~~ with the intention which now passes through their mind ~~and~~ that the ~~most~~ ^{best} success of this operation would be the ruin of Japan to the benefit of France which might bring about far-reaching political consequences.

[illegible]

General Allegro's caravan will doubtless be armed, and will be possibly, if not properly, protected by a force, so that whether it succeed in making its way into and through the Tougou country, or whether it will meet with the same fate as the French Expedition, is a question altogether undecidable. It is, however, suggested by a reliable person, that the caravan will be accompanied by a force of 1000 men, and that the caravan will be accompanied by a force of 1000 men, and that the caravan will be accompanied by a force of 1000 men.

I learn from a sure source that at the moment a very active correspondence is going on between the Residency and Sirpo. I have &c.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 88.

M. Millet to the Authorities at Goble.

Twins, 16 May, 1945

M. SMADJA LUMBROSO, négociant à Tunis, se rend à Gahès sur les indications que lui a données l'administration pour acheter, à ses risques et périls, un chargement de natron et autres marchandises apportées à Gahès par un caravane l'après-midi qu'il passe ces marchandises sur la frontière, franchises de droit

(Signé) **BENÉ MILLET,**

(Signé) **RENÉ MILLET,**
Président-Général de la République Française.

Lockstore 2 in No. 80

Commandant Rebillet is the Khelifa de l'Arad.

F. RIBILLET Chef de Bataillon aux 4^e Zouaves, recommande tout particulièrement à Sa Hautesse ben-Haba, le hasside de l'Arad, M. L... qui lui a fait de l'achat de marchandises apportées à Gahès par la caravane des Fozzan. Il lui a été à l'occasion de lui prêter son appareil de la faire accompagner...

REBILLET

Inclosure 3 in 3 33

Commandant's Pick to Commandant's Conference

LE Commandant I^{er} Chef de Bataillon, 1^{er} Régiment d'Infanterie de Service de
renseignements et de Liaison de l'Armée, a l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint
à M. le Colonel, Commandant, le Major M. Lumbroso, et le Lieutenant
(111)

St. Louis, Lombroso, qui se rend à Gabès pour y traiter avec la caravane des Persans de l'échiquier du patron apporté par celle-ci.

Mon bien, &c.
(Signed) F. PLEB.

No. 34

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 42. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, June 18, 1895.

My Austrian colleague has informed me that he has lately had occasion to appoint a Consular Agent at Goletha in place of the late Consul-General.

At first he intended to appoint a man of his own choice, but after some reflection he decided to appoint a man of the Government.

On coming some days later he said that he had, on the part of the Resident, requested that the appointment should be cancelled, as he did not wish to appoint a man of the Government.

Baron Perera tells me that he replied very politely, but *totidem verbis*, that he failed to see how the matter in any way concerned the French Government. He was responsible to his Government, and to his Government alone, for such appointments, and he had an indisputable Treaty right to make them as and when he chose. He said that the first time he had heard of the matter that M. Millet has unnecessarily insisted on the fact that the appointment was a purely French affair, and that the French Government was bound to pursue towards them—the huge landed and indolent nature of the man, and the rebuffs that he had met with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 35

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 43. Confidential.)

My Lord,

SHORTLY after receiving this morning's despatch from Tunis, I went to the Resident-General to speak unofficially to him on the subject of the appointment of a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

I began by saying that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan. I said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

I then said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan. I said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

This disconcerted him for a minute, but he quickly recovered and said that M. Mianault had paid 2000 francs to be pleased with the appointment. He said that M. Mianault had paid 2000 francs to be pleased with the appointment.

M. Millet added that all this happened five years ago, that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

As M. Millet kept repeating that he was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan, I said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

I then said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan. I said that I was a little surprised to find that the French Government had appointed a man of the Government to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

I replied, "I should of course have done in any case." He then calmed down somewhat, and said that he would do something about its being functions; he would be simply a clerk, and then he added something about its being a clerk.

He then calmed down somewhat, and said that he would do something about its being functions; he would be simply a clerk, and then he added something about its being a clerk. He then calmed down somewhat, and said that he would do something about its being functions; he would be simply a clerk, and then he added something about its being a clerk.

I then again quietly reminded him of the opening of our conversation, and said that such a statement was quite unnecessary.

I thought it advisable before speaking to M. Millet, even unofficially, on this subject, to have your Lordship's instructions, as I know his violent and arbitrary character, and thought it possible that any suggestion which in any way impugned his action would be badly received. My telling him that I should report the matter home, although it drew an outburst from him, really brought him to book to a certain extent.

It is possible that he wants to have in the police a creature of his own who will be a facile tool. Part of his conversation was devoted to violent abuse of the Commissary who resigned rather than suffer Camus' presence in his office.

As a matter of personal opinion, I do not believe that the appointment was intended to be only temporary. Thus was, I am convinced, an afterthought, and even now I am by no means sure that M. Millet's half-hearted assurance on this point was anything but an evasion. Was it not a little odd to place a criminal in this post if it be only a temporary appointment?

He is quite incapable of appreciating that such an appointment might be looked upon as an affront. His only point of view is that the slightest criticism of it even is an attack on his authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 36

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, June 20, 1895.

IT may be as well that I should add a few lines to my despatch No. 43 of yesterday with reference to my conversation with the Resident on the subject of his appointment to the post of Secretary to the Commissioner of Police of the man convicted of torturing the British subjects at Kairwan.

My demeanour and language throughout was most forbearing, though I confess that there were moments when I was somewhat tried, still, knowing M. Millet's absolute and chronic want of self-control, I was careful not to say anything that could give him the slightest excuse for being rude, which I should have been forced to take notice of, so we parted in a perfectly friendly manner.

His remark about dictation was absolutely uncalled for. There was never the slightest hint or word that could justify it.

This is the first time that I have had a difference of opinion with M. Millet, but I have had occasion to notice that the slightest expression contrary to his ideas brings forth a flood of angry and ill-considered words, so I was perfectly prepared for his *emportement*, which would have surprised me in any one else.

The moment that I broached the subject he flew out. Doubtless, he was already

1

Ah! si vous entendiez, M. Ribot, les commentaires de la population étrangère sur votre Ministère, il n'est pas douteux que votre patrie comme la nôtre en serait humiliée et que vous seriez à la fois privé du fâcheux qui méconnaît de la sorte l'honneur de son pays et de la personne, mais il n'y a pas de doute non plus qu'une erreur du fait se représente.

Ce n'est pas un Résident, c'est un commis-voyageur.

EM LACROIX.

No. 38.

Consul-General Haggard to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, June 24, 1895.

I HAVE ascertained the truth of the report of the existence in the Bizerta Canal of the rock which was discovered by Captain No. 18 of the H.M.S. "Thetis."

It appears that it is well within 30 feet of the surface, and that its removal which Captain No. 18 begs will take three or four days at a push.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 39.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received July 10.)

(No. 48. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, July 1, 1895.

WITH reference to my letter No. 45 of the 21st inst. in the subject of the appointment of a post in the police of Bizerta, and of the letter of two British Agents I have the pleasure to inform you that I have been in possession of an article from the "Unione"—the Italian newspaper here.

From the temperate tone of this article, from such a quarter with such an authority, we might almost suspect that it may have received official approval, if not supervision, but, as I have obtained from conversation with my Italian colleagues, it is a mere copy of a letter from the Consul-General to the Resident.

The only new incident in connection with this matter which I have learnt is that when the Commissioner of Police of Bizerta, M. Balosay, was asked by the Consul-General to show the impossibility of such an appointment, M. Balosay refused to do so, and then resigned the service, whereupon M. Balosay then and there resigned.

This shows that, when in his conversation with me M. Millet said that M. Balosay had done as he was told, he spoke in accordance with his real knowledge of the facts of the case.

All the circumstances connected with this matter have made a very great and, I may say, a very painful impression here, and people are aghast at the conduct, not only so odious but so extraordinary from so high a position of a man who was such absolute power as has the French Resident-General in the Regency, and are beginning to ask themselves with wonder not unmixed with anxiety, "What next?"

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 39.

Extract of an Article from the "Unione" in reference to the Dismissed Commissary of Police.

(Translation.)

UP to the present moment we have expected, if not a denial—impossible under the circumstances—at least some kind of an explanation of an unfortunate incident which occurred some days ago at the Italian Registry Station between the French Resident and the ex-Commissary of Police, M. Balosay. This we have expected, for the opponents of M. Millet have assiduously related and commented upon the incident in the public journals with such a wealth of unedifying particulars and with such bitter criticism, that we may well ask ourselves whether this silence with reference to the comments of the public is fit and proper.

We ask this with greater persistency, inasmuch as the "Protectorat," one of the Opposition papers, conducted in a serious fashion, whose articles are written with calm judgment, does not hesitate to examine the incident from a point of view which interests all Europeans settled in this country.

Indeed, our contemporary asks itself whether the public is not justified in its apprehensions at seeing an office so important as that filled by the Resident-General of France and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sovereign at the mercy of an individual who cannot control his personal resentment, but gives vent to it, *coram populi*, in words which are scarcely permitted in the secrecy of one's chamber.

We do not wish to enter into the merits of the case between the two Franco-Tunisian functionaries, unless it be to touch upon one of its most salient features, hitherto not touched, and with reason, but which is worthy of notice.

The reason of the misfortune which has befallen M. Balosay, as is affirmed, is his refusal to agree to accept as an important functionary in his Department a Commissary of Police who, while in the south of the Regency, was subjected to disciplinary measures and condemned for maltreating an Anglo-Maltese subject, in whose favour the Consular Representative of Her Britannic Majesty intervened.

This version of the matter, as yet uncontradicted, is fraught with several instructive reflections. For example, there is one which may be summed up as follows: if the Administration and the judicial authority of the country intervened with the result that the work of this functionary was condemned and punished, how can this same Administration, after a short lapse of time, so change its mind as to conclude to him still more delicate functions?

Is it not, perhaps, proper—nay, we will go further, and say, is it not the duty of him to whom is confided the superintendence of police and its responsibilities, to call the attention of his superiors to the danger which would result from receiving as a subaltern a man who has undergone a sentence, brought about, as we are assured, by the inquiry carried out by this very Superintendent?

Well, then, what guarantee can there be from a Government—and this is the most delicate part of the question under consideration—which at one time, under diplomatic pressure, lends itself to building an inquiry into, and consequently to exposing the conduct of a man, and then regards him in a manner so undistinguished as to cause mistrust, not only amongst the public but also in the mind of the Superintendent who conducted the inquiry, but also in the very Consular authority which in the past demanded and obtained due satisfaction?

If, then, the "Protectorat" publicly demands an explanation of the want of coolness displayed by the Resident, it is perfectly within its right, inasmuch as that which its patriotism as a French newspaper prevents it from saying is being universally whispered and talked about among the mass of the public.

The public are discussing the merits and demerits of M. Balosay. The matter is brought to a more objective and cool examination, with a result not particularly flattering to M. Millet. In the punishment of the Commissary in his honourable resistance, and in the anger given vent to in an entirely unsuitable locality, the public sees an abuse of power for reasons of political spite there, where equanimity should alone hold sway.

We are aware that our action as Opposition journalists is characterized at the Residency as but the giving vent to unjustifiable anger in a bitter, partizan, and personal manner. With such unmerited accusations as these we have not troubled

The order of value is :—

1. France, including Algiers, which sends a good deal).
2. The coast.

3. In whose trade and year is stated as follows: amount to 100,000.

...important a part (about 18 per cent.) of the total supply of this

do not stick at trifles in their endeavour to make trade, other France, ~~which~~

It is generally stated, for instance, in commercial circles here, that at the port of Tunis alone—the return in one item alone, that of Manchester goods—has been under-
 stated to the amount of 80,000*l*.

Every sort of device is said to be practised to conceal the real amount of foreign trade generally. Mr Galen, British Vice-Consul, and a leading merchant at Sumatra, partner in the firm of Messrs. Perry, Bury, and Co.—speaks as follows in a Report he sent to me on the subject:—

"Goods brought by French steamers" (by far the largest amount of goods reaching Marseilles) down as French, while goods brought by German, Italian, Russian, and other steamers, etc., are classified as foreign.

"The reason that we have a strike to cut away at the price of the goods coming from B is that we are not getting a fair price for the goods that we are producing. It is important to make the price of the goods that we are producing fair and to make it important to get a fair price for the goods that we are producing."

trade as convenient as possible.

1. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 2. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 3. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 4. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 5. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 6. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 7. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 8. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 9. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$
 10. $\text{CH}_3\text{COOH} + \text{H}_2\text{O} \rightleftharpoons \text{CH}_3\text{COO}^- + \text{H}^+$

of 7 million Trans-

James Anglin introduced

opinion, or even of the evidence
are based. The published

are based. The published price
of \$97,154 for the first quarter
of the year (G. N. Report #1)
is a preliminary figure which should have been

I have, &c
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

I have, &c

(2.12)

W. H. D. Haggard

TABLE showing Value of Imports to Tunis from all Countries and from Great Britain.

All Countries.			Great Britain.		
1893.	1894.	Increase.	1893.	1894.	Increase.
£	£	£	£	£	£
1,644,329	1,876,909	141,580	200,470	206,064	7,594

No. 45

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Habsburg.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 26. Commercial. Confidential.)

TUES, July 28, 1695.

My Lord,

My Lord,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, Commercial, I have the honour to acknowledge with gratification, from the "Tribune Française," the organ of the French colonists on the subject of the proposed revision of the Aug. 1814 Convention Treaty.

This article may be taken as reflecting and summing up the views held here by the Treaty.

active opponents of that Treaty, so it may be as well to analyze it. The economic evolution of the R. ~~country~~ ^{country} will not be sufficient to ~~bring~~ ^{bring} about our liberty of action with reference to ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~country~~ ^{country} as we need to us."

[illegible]

The article then goes on to state, quite accurately, as I have shown in previous

The terms of the XLth Article on which [redacted] is based, do not admit of such an interpretation. It seems that [redacted] may call upon the other to enter upon a revision, at [redacted] have been accomplished by common consent, and a new Convention shall have [redacted] and put into execution, the present Convention shall continue and remain in full force."

It is to be observed that though one of the Contracting Parties is at liberty to call upon the other to ratify the Treaty, there is no obligation on the other to respond to the call. It is to be observed also that the present Convention remains in full force. It was at this point that the French representative of the statement of the "Tunis Française," that the Treaty can be denounced

any choice to repudiate in Tunis, i.e. that the unexcused perpetration of the wrong gives them a right to commit any other with impunity.

[414]

1

The next paragraph begins: "The moment has arrived for France to have free action. This, and for its not only to be bound by the Convention with the Bey," that is to say, and it is impossible to say that the Convention with the Bey is to be kept as a rule in the Convention with the Bey. It is impossible to say that the Convention with the Bey is a mere figure of speech, as the Convention with the Bey has never been at the end of a road letter.

It is not necessary to refer to the rest of the paragraph, nor to point out the vagueness of the refusal to us of compensations which we might have. It would be interesting to know what the compensation is.

I have no any I think shown that the concluding words of this article are a mere phrase. The Convention with the Bey is indeed, be a question of life and death for the Convention with the Bey. It is impossible to say that the Convention with the Bey is a mere phrase.

If I am not mistaken, it has been because it fairly summarizes the views, far from being entertained here, and probably inspired by the Convention with the Bey. It is impossible to say that the Convention with the Bey is a mere phrase. It is impossible to say that the Convention with the Bey is a mere phrase.

So far the Italian Treaty has not been denounced, but within which this has to be done. It is of course possible that this delay indicates a hesitation on the part of France to still further irritate Italy with reference to Tunis, and that the Treaty may not be denounced after all, in which case it will be good for twenty-eight years more. But the Italians here are anxious, and it is on our Treaty that they really, as a rule, are common with other nations under the most-favoured-nation clause.

There is no doubt that the Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey. Your Lordship will be interested in the Convention with the Bey. The Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey. The Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey.

There is no doubt that the Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey. Your Lordship will be interested in the Convention with the Bey. The Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey. The Convention with the Bey is a French Colony, greatly interested in the value of the Convention with the Bey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Extract from the "Tunis Francaise."

Nous avons vu, avec un certain étonnement, dans leurs discours du 14 Juillet, ni le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

No. 46.

Mr. Howard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 263.)

Paris, August 13, 1895

My Lord,

WITH reference to Mr. Haggard's despatch No. 50 of the 3rd volume I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the article which has appeared in the "Matin," drawing attention to the fact that unless the Italian Treaty with Tunis of the 8th September, 1868, is not denounced before the 8th proximo, according to the terms of the same it will be renewed ipso facto for another twenty-eight years.

In the interest of France, where only a Protectorate exists, at where Frenchmen are as much at home as in Algeria, it is of course of great importance that the Convention with the Bey of Tunis should be renewed. The Convention with the Bey of Tunis should be renewed. The Convention with the Bey of Tunis should be renewed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY HOWARD.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Extract from the "Matin" of August 12, 1895.

LE Protectorat de la France sur la Tunisie, qui dure depuis tantôt quinze années, touche à sa fin. Une loi importante, dont on doit se soucier, est à présent en discussion. Elle est la Convention avec le Bey de Tunis. Cette Convention, conclue pour vingt-huit ans, est du 8 Septembre 1868, et sera renouvelée ipso facto pour une même durée si elle n'est pas dénoncée avant le terme fixé. C'est dire que la dénonciation doit en être faite sans retard dans un délai maximum de trois semaines.

Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey. Il est probable que le Président de la Chambre de Commerce, ni le Président de la Chambre d'Agriculture n'ont pas eu la moindre mention de la Convention avec le Bey.

On ne saurait avoir un instant d'hésitation et se laisser arrêter par des considérations secondaires. Le Traité avec l'Italie doit être dénoncé; il doit l'être régulièrement, officiellement, avant le 8 Septembre prochain. Le dé-

Bosnie et l'Herzégovine, et nous pouvions fort bien invoquer ce précédent, mais notre Gouvernement y mit ses scrupules et ne crut pas devoir créer des privilèges en notre faveur et se borna à ne pas renouveau les divers Traités à mesure qu'ils arrivent à terme. Aujourd'hui, il n'y a plus entre la Tunisie et les Puissances que deux Traités qui contiennent la clause de la nation la plus favorisée. L'un est le Traité avec l'Angleterre, signé sans fixation de durée, l'autre est le Traité avec l'Italie. Celui-ci, conclu pour vingt ans, expire le 30 Septembre 1896, si on le dénonce avant le 8 Septembre, 1895; faute de quoi, il se renouvellera de lui-même par voie de tacite reconduction. C'est ce Traité qui est reconnu de dénoncer, afin d'avoir dorénavant la main libre, ou à peu près, pour conclure d'autres.

En effet, il n'est nullement à craindre que l'Angleterre, par le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, se livre à des manœuvres de nature à nuire à nos intérêts. Le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, de créer une situation d'incertitude, qui n'est pas favorable à nos intérêts, et qui, au contraire, leur est favorable. L'Angleterre, par le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, se livre à des manœuvres de nature à nuire à nos intérêts. Le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, de créer une situation d'incertitude, qui n'est pas favorable à nos intérêts, et qui, au contraire, leur est favorable.

En effet, il n'est nullement à craindre que l'Angleterre, par le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, se livre à des manœuvres de nature à nuire à nos intérêts. Le fait même de la non-ratification de ce Traité, de créer une situation d'incertitude, qui n'est pas favorable à nos intérêts, et qui, au contraire, leur est favorable.

No. 44

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose to you two extracts from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" with reference to the port of Bizerte.

These may be taken as representing the intentions with reference to Bizerte, though it yet remains to be proved whether, for the present at least, those intentions will be carried out.

It is reported that a large number of ships, which were lately there with a quantity of torpedoes, are now in the process of being dismantled, and that the construction of a new naval arsenal is being commenced. It is also reported that the French Government are considering the possibility of establishing a naval base at Bizerte.

I have, &
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of June 25, 1895.

ALL patriotes qui se montrent peints de la participation de la France à la grande manifestation navale de Kiel, n'ont pas oublié de rappeler que le 4 Juin dernier, la France toute seule se livrait à une manifestation navale dont l'importance leur a sans doute échappé, car ils ont perdu une belle occasion d'exulter.

Il s'agissait aussi de l'inauguration d'un canal ou, pour parler plus exactement, de la prise de possession par la marine militaire Française d'un établissement maritime à peine ouvert d'her au commerce et à la navigation.

Le nouveau canal Français n'a certainement pas les dimensions gigantesques de la voie maritime que l'Empereur Guillaume a fait ouvrir entre la Baltique et la Mer du Nord. Sa longueur n'est, en effet, que de 1,500 mètres au lieu de 98 kilom. du canal Allemand; mais sa largeur, à la cuvette, est de 120 mètres et sa profondeur de 9 mètres. C'est donc lui aussi, un canal ouvert aux plus grands bâtiments de guerre, comme aux plus grands bâtiments marchands; cuirassés et paquebots pourront y circuler à l'aise, par tous les temps, sans avoir même à se préoccuper du courant et de l'étiage de la mer, sans avoir besoin de stationner, pour entrer ou sortir, dans une de ces écluses où les opérations sont toujours si longues et si délicates.

C'est qu'en effet notre canal, à nous, met en communication les eaux de la Méditerranée avec les eaux de ce grand lac naturel caché derrière Bizerte, qui forme un des plus beaux rapports de la Tunisie à la France.

Nous n'avons pas besoin de donner à nos lecteurs la description de cette partie de la côte tunisienne où s'élevait, il y a quelques années, une simple bourgade de pêcheurs, dont les barques seules pouvaient franchir la lagune séparant la pleine mer du lac, et où s'élèvera bientôt toute une ville neuve, commerçante et industrielle.

Tout le monde connaît maintenant Bizerte, au moins de nom; mais ce que l'on ne sait pas suffisamment, c'est qu'une transformation complète de ce port s'est accomplie en quatre années par les soins d'ingénieurs Français et avec des capitaux Français. Cette transformation n'a pas eu seulement pour but d'ouvrir une nouvelle escale aux steamers qui sillonnent le bassin Méditerranéen, mais avant tout d'ouvrir à notre marine militaire, sur la côte septentrionale de l'Afrique, un établissement qui peut être considéré comme sans rival par sa disposition topographique et par ses vastes proportions.

On a déjà comparé le Lac de Bizerte à l'étang de Berre et à la rade de Brest, mais il a sur celle-ci et sur celui-là l'avantage d'un accès infiniment plus commode et d'un abri plus parfait encore. Il n'est point balayé comme l'un et l'autre par de bourrasques de nord-ouest ou de sud-ouest qui en rendent parfois la navigation périlleuse pour les bateaux d'un faible tonnage.

Déjà, depuis l'année dernière, plusieurs navires de commerce, et notamment des paquebots de la Compagnie Transatlantique, étaient venus s'amarrer le long des quais de l'Avant-port, attestant ainsi la praticabilité de l'Avant-port et du Canal pour des bâtiments de fort tonnage. Il appartenait à la marine militaire de venir à son tour visiter le nouveau mouillage qui doit lui offrir des ressources si précieuses en temps de guerre; c'est ce qu'elle a fait, il y a une quinzaine de jours à peine.

Les trois divisions formant l'escadre active de la Méditerranée, sous les ordres de l'Amiral de La Jaille, sont venues en quelque sorte prendre officiellement possession de Bizerte.

Tandis que les vaisseaux cuirassés s'arrêtaient dans l'Avant-port, le grand croiseur "Suchet," accompagné du "Wattignies" et du "Faucon," et des avisos torpilleurs "Lévrier," "Argonautes," et "Léger" s'engageaient dans le Canal; puis, après avoir évolué dans le lac, ces navires venaient mouiller devant Raz-el-Ouzi.

Désormais, la France a à sa disposition un port militaire de plus, qu'elle a le devoir d'outiller et de protéger dans la limite de ses ressources, afin d'être un jour à la hauteur du rôle auquel la nature semble l'avoir prédestinée. N'oublions pas que Bizerte doit devenir la grande escale Méditerranéenne des bâtiments transitant par Gibraltar et Suva, le grand entrepôt de charbon Français, rivalisant avec les entrepôts Anglais de Gibraltar et de Malte, enfin une des meilleures bases d'opérations de notre flotte opérant contre les forces navales de la Triple Alliance et contre celles de l'Angleterre.

Bizerte doit devenir pour nous dire un Toulon Africain, avec Bonifacio pour trait d'union entre lui et le Toulon Européen.

Nous avons donc raison de dire, en commençant, que la petite manifestation de la

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of July 26, 1895.

[illegible]

avoir à Alger depuis longtemps et ce que nous réclamons, les autorités locales trop

« Depuis trois ans, M. Marchal, reprenant au Conseil Supérieur les idées qu'il a eu l'honneur de développer dans le "Petit Océan", a fait, à l'Assemblée, de nombreuses propositions, chaque année, au vu pour obtenir la création de grands ateliers maritimes de réparation dans le port d'Alger.

Ports et Chasse et une de la Marine ne font absolument rien pour hâter sa

"Nos superbes bassins de radoub restent inutilisés pendant que le matériel s'accumule contre nous. C'est le désert de Bizerte qui nous sert de poubelle. Le matériel ne reviendrait logiquement à Alger."

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury — (Received August 19.)

Tues, July 20, 1895.

Will be glad to send you an extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" with reference to the Tunisian phosphate beds.

Those near Gtisa are, I have been told by the Directors of Agriculture and Public Works, the ~~most~~ ^{most} intelligent men, of extraordinary richness, and there are, as it appears, others in the Regency.

Perhaps it is to the export duty on these that the Government would like to supply the revenue which would be lost by the destruction of the export tax. It is, however, at least not to be expected that the Government will be able to do so.

It is, however, at least, not to be expected that the French Government will have a chance of receiving surrenders from British subjects to work the Algerian plan. It is possible that the French Government will be able to secure the surrender of the terms which have been offered, which is somewhat remarkable in view of the fact that the French Government, against which the British Government is acting, is the only one which is not a party to the conflict.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of July 28, 1895.

IL y a quelques jours à peine, le 9 Juillet, M. le Sénateur Pauliat dénonçait devant la Chambre Haute, sous une interpellation qui fit grand bruit, les ruses très répréhensibles entachant, selon lui, de nullité les Concessions faites à des particuliers dans la région des phosphates dits de Tebessa.

Dans quelques semaines, peut-être, le Parlement devra examiner à leur tour les Articles qui servent de bases à l'accord conclu le 25 Juin dernier entre le Gouvernement Bevirai et les concessionnaires des phosphates Tnoisena.

On sait en quoi consiste l'économie principale de l'Acte dont nous parlons et qui vient d'être passé entre M. Pavillier, Directeur-Général des Travaux Publics, et M. Maurice de Robert.

Nous avons souvent entretenu nos lecteurs des efforts faits par le Gouvernement pour tirer le meilleur parti possible des gisements de Gafsa; l'intention bien arrêtée dans son esprit, et que nous ne saurions blâmer, de subordonner l'autorisation d'exploiter à l'obligation de construire une voie ferrée de 250 kilom. reliant les gisements au port de Sfax, avait, plusieurs fois déjà, entraîné l'avortement des négociations.

Celles-ci viennent enfin d'aboutir, mais d'une façon absolument inattendue; non content, en effet, d'abandonner, par l'Article 6, aux concessionnaires l'exploitation des phosphates qui se rencontrent sur les terrains domaniaux situés au sud-ouest de Guelma, le périmètre comprenant les Djebels Zitoun, Zaïra, Alina, Sedja, Motlaoui, et de leur céder, à titre gratuit, en toute propriété, 30,000 hectares de terrains aux cultures, situés dans le contrôle de Stax, générosité fort compréhensible à notre sens, le Directeur-Général des Travaux Publics a introduit dans la Convention, sous le No. 13, un Article qui renverse toutes les idées de justice et d'équité admises

Un partagera certainement notre appréciation quand on saura qu'aux termes de cet Art. 10 "en ce qui concerne les gisements connus ou à découvrir dans les terrains situés en dehors du périmètre de protection ci-dessus défini (de la région de Gafsa), le Gouvernement Tunisien s'engage à non accorder la Concession qu'après avoir appelé en concurrence avec les demandeurs les titulaires de la présente Concession."

Un Français, cela veut dire qu'il n'a rien de plus qu'un trait de plume sont biffés, supprimés, écartés, les droits de nos compatriotes habitant la Tunisie qui se sont occupés de recherches de ce genre, cela veut dire que ces chercheurs intelligents, que ces travailleurs infatigables sont lésés au profit de financiers qui n'ont jamais mis les pieds en Tunisie, mais qui, désormais, en vertu de cet Article 13, n'auront qu'à se présenter, à l'heure présente où ceux qui ont peiné pour découvrir des gisements en solliciteront l'exploitation, pour, moyennant une surenchère insupportable, les déposséder du fruit de leur labeur ; n'y a-t-il pas là, comme en Algérie, de quoi soulever l'opinion publique et attirer l'attention du Parlement ?

Il n'est, certes, pas dans notre esprit la pensée d'établir entre l'affaire de Tebessa et celle de Gafsa le moindre rapprochement, quant aux personnes du moins; nous voudrions même que la dissemblance s'étendit jusqu'aux conséquences qu'elles auront l'une et l'autre, mais la vérité nous oblige à dire qu'il y a eu l'autre lourde en Tunisie aussi bien qu'en Algérie, et que, si l'Administration de la Colonie voitine a pêché gravement, soit en manquant de prévoyance, soit en fermant les yeux sur les tripotages qui se faisaient sous son couvert, l'Administration Tunisienne à, de son côté, compromis, peut-être à jamais, les intérêts de notre agriculture et commis en outre un déni de justice flagrant qui engage gravement sa responsabilité.

leur état, en Tunisie, dans le Tiers et pas inutile de jeter un coup d'oeil sur l'état de la question phosphatière en Algérie et en Tunisie, il y a seulement deux mois, il serait, en effet, injuste que les quelques hommes qui, en Tunisie, viennent de consacrer à la recherche et à la découverte de gisements importants de longs mois voire des années, au cours desquels ils ont exposé leur santé en se livrant à un travail opiniâtre et par conséquent dangereux de supporter, qui, en Tunisie, la grande industrie n'est allée, avec raison, depuis l'interpellation Pauliat, sur quelques phosphates Algériens.

Chez nos voisins, la question a suivi trois phases bien distinctes : la période de recherches, puis l'obtention des Concessions, obtention entachée de fraude, enfin, l'aliénation aux mains étrangères du privilège obtenu.

La période des recherches s'ouvre en 1890; l'existence de gisements, soupçonnée et signalée en passant par un ingénieur qui donna, ce jour-là, la preuve d'une remarquable

On ne saurait donc éprouver—toute exception éventuelle mise à part—an grand intérêt pour ceux qui, en Algérie, ont mis les premiers la main sur les trésors que cette terre recèle, ce n'est pas à eux que se trouve l'auteur réel de la découverte. La nation est, en ce point, privilégiée et surtout l'usage qu'il y a en elle de leur

Les choses se passèrent tout autrement en Tunisie.

Depuis la révélation, faite en 1885, par M. Thomas, géologue en mission, de l'existence d'importantes réserves de phosphates dans la région de Guelma, de nombreuses recherches ont été opérées, par de simples particuliers, sur toute l'étendue de la Régence; mais ces recherches ont permis de constater que la région de Guelma, notamment, d'autres placers aussi riches que ceux du sud, plus facilement exploitables, peut-être, et dont l'emplacement n'était pas même soupçonné par nos ingénieurs.

[illegible]

Voilà pourtant, dans toute son étendue, le danger

Voilà pourtant, dans toute son étendue, le mal que causera infailliblement un Actuel, un seul, isolé, on ne voit ni comment ni pourquoi, dans une région elle-même, si on s'était borné à concéder les concessions faites dans cette région en échange d'une voie ferrée. L'Actuel fait un instrument d'oppression et de spoliation, il est à bon droit les résultats d'un acte de violence.

Notre avis est donc raisonnable de dire que si, en Algérie, l'Administration
l'Administration en Tunisie n'était pas moins répréhensible, car elle a disposé, en faveur d'une Société, si
intéressante soit-elle, des résultats d'études qui ne lui appartenant nullement et dont
l'occupation constitue un véritable déni de justice.

Un abus de pouvoir aussi criant ne saurait être passé inaperçu. Il est d'ailleurs d'un caractère si général; qu'il importe les blessés, voire les tués, dans l'affaire qui nous occupe, on l'a compris, si n'en saurait être rangé le Directeur-Général des Travaux Publics, mais encore elle est défectueuse à d'autres points de vue, et, si nous nous contentons aujourd'hui de donner de l'affaire un aperçu général, c'est dans l'intention de l'examiner en détail dans de prochains articles.

Count-General Hooft to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

(No 00. Confidential)

Ms Lovel,

Tune. August 5, 1896.

As the inst within which the Iran Treaty with Teheran must be denounced, or renewed ~~suo facto~~ if its non having been denounced, leaves but it is now less than six weeks the terms of its execution last that I have said I agree without that denunciations has been more at least a year, since which, Mr. Ambassador being away from Paris, it was impossible that the President could have taken up the important question that is going to take place - namely that point to oppose

This exciting work is one of the published in a large type in the "series" of the second article, and is written by a young man, a paper published in England in which, the said article is appeared, is published in this manner as it is not a text at all, but a picture of a scene, and the picture is very good and some of the

Perhaps our strongest feature is that we are not made to feel the weight of any such heavy stuff as war and famine. It is suggested that on behalf the Boy of Tunis should himself denounce the Treaty, and thereby free the French yoke still closer round his neck and that of his country—thus illustrating the character of the so-called protection of this country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Include in No. 50

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of August 14, 1895.

LE TRAITE ITALO-TUNISIN.—Malgré les sacrifices que nous faisons pour l'Algérie, malgré les immenses services rendus au pays par notre Administration, nous ne sommes pas libres en Tunisie.

In vain l'Europe nous a-t-elle autorisés à disposer du sort de la Régence, en vain avons-nous enrichi la population Tunisienne en lui assurant les avantages d'une Administration régulière. Une autorité étrangère fonctionne encore dans la Régence. Elle a créé des institutions, des associations qui forment un Etat dans l'Etat, qu'à leur gré, elle peut détruire ou modifier à son plaisir.

Nous protégeons la Tunisie, nous accordons à ses produits un traitement d'exception. Qu'importe! nous n'avons pas le droit de faire pénétrer nos marchandises en Tunisie, sans acquitter des droits d'importation égaux à ceux que paient les étrangers.

Que les Italiens résident, commercer, posséder en Tunisie, y exercent tous les droits civils compatibles avec leur qualité d'étrangers, nous aurons mauvaise grâce à nous en fâcher. Ce sont des droits naturels, dont l'exercice leur est aussi bien acquis qu'en France.

Ils peuvent en jouer dans ce prolongement de l'Algérie Française.

Mais que les citoyens Italiens jouissent du droit de pêche, dans les eaux Tunisiennes, même en principe; qu'ils exercent le commerce de cabotage et d'escale, qui nous est refusé sur leur littoral; que leurs propriétés foncières acquittent moins d'impôts que celles des Tunisiens ou des Français; que leurs importations jouissent du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée—refusé à nos produits en Italie—voilà ce qui est inadmissible.

Ces divers privilèges ont donné aux 25.000 Italiens campés dans la Régence une cohésion et une influence que la France n'aurait pu supporter, à l'époque où la Triple Alliance était inconnue. Au point de vue économique, les avantages exceptionnels conférés à l'importation Tunisienne sur les marchés Français légitiment nos aspirations à un traitement réciproque. L'Union Douanière de la France et de la Tunisie, à moitié réalisée aux dépens de nos finances et de nos producteurs, doit être complétée au delà de la Méditerranée.

Mais rien n'est possible aussi longtemps que la Tunisie restera liée vis-à-vis de l'Italie par le Traité ass. polit. que q. a. non renouvelé au 5 septembre, 1866.

Heureusement ce Traité n'est pas perpétuel. L'Article XXV limite sa durée à vingt huit ans, à partir de l'échange des ratifications, qui est sûrement antérieur au 8 Décembre, 1866.

Le 8 Décembre, 1896, au plus tard, la France et la Tunisie seront donc délivrées de ces entraves.

Une revision était possible avant l'expiration de chaque septième année, c'est-à-dire en 1875, en 1882 et en 1889. Que n'as-tu pas fait usage de cette faculté en 1882, cela est explicable, que tu n'as pu l'utiliser en 1889, la vigilance gouvernementale est certainement restée en défaut.

Mais ce qui serait inadmissible ce serait que le Gouvernement actuel, que M. Ribot, Président du Conseil, que M. Delcassé, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, laissent passer, sans agir, à la fin de l'année 1896, la date de 1896, c'est-à-dire qu'ils renonceraient à l'affranchissement de la Tunisie de toute ingérence politique, économique, et administrative, et à la pleine souveraineté de la Tunisie.

L'après l'Article XXV, "le présent Traité restera en vigueur pendant vingt-huit ans, à partir de l'échange des ratifications. Mais si, l'un des deux États, n'a pas dénoncé par une des Parties Contractantes, il est considéré comme renouvelé pour une période semblable."

Ainsi, si le Résident-Général de France, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Régence de Tunis, si le Roy lui-même au besoin... et peut-être est-ce le seul moyen efficace, ne dénonce pas dans un délai de six semaines environ le Traité du 20 Djoumadiet-Aoual, 1266, l'Italie restera pendant vingt-huit ans Puissance autonome à quelques heures de la Sicile. Elle aura 25,000, 50,000, peut-être 100,000 nationaux serrés autour de leur Consul-Général, organisés en Sociétés de Secours Mutuels, de Gymnastique, ou d'Instruction Militaire,* avec un chemin de fer pour point d'appui ou pour ligne de retraite sur le littoral, les bâtiments des gares pour casernes, les équipages de pêcheurs côtiers pour renforts.

La dénonciation du Traité Italo-Tunisien est une mesure indispensable. La politique l'exige; les intérêts du commerce Français et de la colonisation nationale indissolublement liés à l'assimilation douanière de la France et de la Tunisie la rendent tout aussi nécessaire.

M. Hanotaux, qui a déjà fait preuve de décision et d'habileté, ne commettra pas une faute impardonnable. Il ne suivra pas les conseils de prudence ou plutôt d'imprudence qui doivent déjà lui être prodigués, il ne se laissera pas abuser par les combinaisons illicites à l'aide desquelles les intéressés cherchent sans doute à le circonvenir ou à endormir sa vigilance.

Du reste, le Gouvernement de la Régence peut accorder à l'Italie, par une Convention nouvelle, absolument distincte de l'ancienne, tous les droits légitimes accordés en France aux étrangers en général. Les Italiens doivent jouir, même en Tunisie, des avantages du droit commun. Mais il serait plus qu'imprudent de leur concéder aucun avantage particulier, fût-ce même le traitement commercial de la nation la plus favorisée.

Nous reproduisons ci-dessous le texte ou une analyse de tous les Articles du Traité Italo-Tunisien de 1866. Ils sont si peu connus en France qu'une reproduction nous a paru indispensable.

"Article I^{er}. Tous les droits, privilèges, et immunités, qui ont été conférés aux Représentants, aux citoyens, et aux navires Italiens en vertu des usages et des Traités existants entre le Royaume de Tunis et les États qui composent aujourd'hui le Royaume d'Italie sont... L'exception des citoyens qui ne s'accorderaient pas avec aucun des Articles de la présente Convention. Il est en outre expressément entendu que tous les droits, privilèges, et immunités que le Royaume de Tunis accorde à présent et pourrait à l'avenir accorder, à quelque titre que ce soit, aux citoyens, aux navires, et au commerce de n'importe quelle autre Puissance étrangère ne sont en rien limités, modifiés, ou affectés, par le présent Traité, aux citoyens, aux navires, au commerce, et à la navigation du Royaume d'Italie.

* "Article XVIII. Les citoyens de chacune des Parties Contractantes pourront librement fonder dans les États de l'autre partie des Sociétés commerciales, industrielles, ou agricoles, et exercer toutes les autres fonctions de commerce."

Le... des Traités de M. de Clercq. Notre Président de la Chambre de Commerce de... a bien voulu nous en communiquer un texte. En Italie, il paraît être impossible... Peut-être serait-il bon de collationner ce texte avec la Minore officielle, déposée dans les archives des... Il nous semble qu'il n'est pas identique au texte officiel Italien que nous avons déjà étudié.

"Par contre, les sujets et les navires Tunisiens, en Italie, continueront de jouir des droits qui leur auront été accordés par les traités antérieurs et seront admis à la jouissance des droits et faveurs qui sont et seront accordés à toute autre Puissance étrangère.

"L'Article II stipule la complète et entière liberté de commerce, de relâche, de navigation avec assimilation des citoyens et des navires Italiens à ceux des nations étrangères les plus privilégiées et des ressortissants de la Régence pour les droits de tonnage, de plans, de port de pilotage, et de quarantaine et autres.

Même assimilation pour le commerce d'échelles et le cabotage en vertu de l'Article III. L'Article IV est dénué d'intérêt.

"Les Articles V, VI, VII et VIII ne sont relatifs qu'à l'exercice des droits naturels de commerce et de navigation dans tous les pays. Mais certains paragraphes de l'Article IX limitent dans une mesure inadmissible la liberté d'action de l'Italie. L'Article IX, paragraphe 1^{er}, stipule que l'Italie s'engage à ne pas augmenter vis-à-vis de l'Italie les droits de douane sur les marchandises d'origine tunisienne. Sa liberté d'exportation est à ce point limitée. La même liberté d'exportation est interdite à l'exportation des marchandises tunisiennes plus avantageux. Il n'était pas applicable simultanément aux marchandises Italiennes. Il s'est également heurté à ce qui concerne l'établissement de monopoles sur l'importation ou d'exportation, excepté pour les armes, les monnaies, le tabac, et les céréales.

"D'après l'Article XII, la valeur moyenne des marchandises d'exportation doit être établie tous les sept ans par des Commissaires nommés par les deux Parties Contractantes.

"Cette détermination a pour but de fixer le montant réel des droits de douane qui sont payés."

"La révision devait avoir lieu au cours des années 1875, 1882, 1889, et 1896, c'est-à-dire pendant les sept années postérieures à l'échange des ratifications."

"D'après l'Article XIII, les citoyens Italiens conservent leur nationalité selon les lois de leur pays d'origine, et ils ne peuvent fonder de colonies tunisiennes."

Le second paragraphe de l'Article XIV a une portée politique indéniable. Il est ainsi conçu:—

"Aucun changement n'aura lieu, en ce qui concerne la protection exercée par le Consul-Général d'Italie à Tunis sur ses propres nationaux, sur les droits, immunités, et privilèges dont jouissent ceux-ci, par les traités, lois, et coutumes.

Ces dispositions ont été introduites dans le Traité de 1866 pour protéger les nationaux dont ils exigent l'entière autonomie. Ils ont été des écoles parement Italiennes qu'ils prétendent soumettre à l'inspection des autorités Françaises ou Tunisiennes.

En 1866, l'Italie n'avait pas encore obtenu l'indépendance complète, et pour la France, Puissance Protectrice, depuis que l'Administration Tunisienne fonctionnait avec autant de perfection qu'une Administration Européenne.

L'Article XV qui s'occupe des usines et des manufactures, le second paragraphe, contient aussi des dispositions privilégiées. Un paragraphe, le second de l'Article, est même dénué de sens de plus, en aucun cas, le Gouvernement de la Régence ne peut imposer de droits de douane sur les marchandises d'origine tunisienne à l'exportation.

Quant au paragraphe... nous croyons qu'il a servi de prétexte au... pour refuser aux Français le droit de visiter les écoles Italiennes.

L'Article XVI concède aux Italiens le droit de pêche, contrairement à la législation Française et aussi aux privilèges spéciaux conférés à la France par un Traité antérieur à 1841.

D'après l'Article XIX le droit d'association est conféré aux sujets Italiens.

Enfin, l'Article XXI, la propriété mobilière et immobilière des Italiens est régie par ce qui est juste. Mais l'Article XXII limite à 40 piastres, soit 2 fr. 40 c. le montant de l'impôt foncier "pour chaque mescia (de 10000 mescias) de terrain". L'autorité Beylicale perd ainsi l'exercice libre de l'impôt foncier. En vertu de cet Article, les propriétaires de terrains bâtis ont le droit de payer les impôts fonciers dérisoires.

Le dernier Article s'occupe de la répartition des impôts des Italiens et des...

successions d'immeubles, autre atteinte à l'exercice des droits de souveraineté Franco-Italienne.

En un mot, divers Articles de ce Traité confèrent à l'Italie et aux Italiens des privilèges commerciaux, politiques, judiciaires, maritimes, et fiscaux inconciliables avec la législation Française et avec toute législation civile.

No. 51.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, August 10, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 5, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo, inclosing a plan on which your Lordship informs me that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty desire that the rock in the Bizerta Channel should be marked and that a light should be placed on it, and that a cable should be laid over the rock, and to receive any further information which may enable them to bring their plan up to date.

I will do my best to carry out their Lordships' wishes, but I fear that, in view of the extreme poverty of the French Government, and the fact that the French Government is at present engaged in a war with Italy, it may be exceedingly difficult to get the French Government to do so.

The rock in question is, however, I hear, being rapidly removed, so that, should I fail in this endeavour, it will not be of permanent importance.

I have, &c

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

No. 52.

Mr. Edwardes to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

No. 140.)

My Lord,

Rome, August 14, 1895.

THE question of the denunciation of the Italian Treaty of 1862 is occupying the serious attention of the Italian Government. In accordance with Article XXV, this Treaty must be denounced by one of the Contracting Parties twelve months before its expiration, the date of which is the 29th September, 1896.

In the course of a conversation I had to-day with M. Maissa he told me that the Italian Government had no doubt but that they would receive, within the prescribed time, notice of the denunciation, and that communications on the subject had passed between the Foreign Office and the Italian Embassy in London.

From M. Maissa's remarks I gathered that fears were entertained that the lapse of this Treaty would have Italian, Tunisian, and French interests in Tunisia, but that the Italian Government in the event of the notification of the denunciation being made to them.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a paragraph which has appeared in the "Tribuna" on this subject, as well as a copy and translation of an article taken from the "Tribuna," which comments on the remarks which have appeared in some French papers.

I have, &c

(Signed) H. G. EDWARDES.

Inclosure 1 in No. 52.

Extract from "L'Italie" of August 14, 1895.

LE TRAITE ITALO-TUNISIEN. N. A. S. S. A. dit que notre Gouvernement s'abstiendra de toute démarche officielle à propos du Traité Italo-Tunisien, tant que ce Traité n'est pas officiellement dénoncé. Dans tous les cas, si des négociations doivent avoir lieu, ce qui n'est que trop probable, elles ne peuvent commencer qu'après la dénonciation.

Pour le moment, ce qu'il y a de mieux à faire, c'est d'attendre la fin du mois de Septembre et la décision du Cabinet Français.

Avouons qu'une entente n'est pas facile, mais il nous revient de bonne source que, même à Paris, on désire trouver une base possible pour s'entendre.

Cette affaire du Traité Italo-Tunisien pourrait bien fournir l'occasion pour résoudre nombre de questions du même genre ouvertes depuis long-temps entre les deux nations, et dont la solution intéresse au même degré autant la France que l'Italie.

Inclosure 2 in No. 52.

Extract from the "Tribuna" of August 12, 1895.

(Translation.)

TELEGRAM from Paris, 12th August:—

The French Government has decided to denounce the Italo-Tunisian Commercial Treaty before it is renewed for twenty-eight years.

"The economic development of Tunisia and the future of the Protectorate demand it because that Treaty paralyzes the action of France politically and financially."

"The 'Matin' enumerates the privileges enjoyed by Italy under the Treaty of 1862, while France, which has spent so many millions, and still yearly spends millions, remains a foreign Power in Tunisia."

The 'Matin' concludes by saying: 'Break the Commercial Treaty between Italy and Tunisia, and the latter will enter into exclusive commercial relations with France which will indemnify her for her sacrifices in that country.'

Before the "Matin" spoke, M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu had written in the same sense in the "Economiste Français." He had pointed out that the Italian Treaty was the chief obstacle to a close Customs Union between France and Tunisia, and hampered French action in that country.

Both from a political and from an economic point of view he argued the Treaty should be denounced.

He declares that the equal treatment of French and Italian goods in the Regency was intolerable, and that it was necessary to put a stop to this equality of treatment, as Tunisia had become a real dependency of France, free of servitudes, and it was also essential that France should strengthen her position on the Mediterranean, as well as in Central Africa.

Those who read this will remark that, according to interested writers, Tunisia is not yet a real dependency of France. She is still under servitudes. If, by the simple denouncing of a Commercial Treaty, her condition can be changed, is that not an alteration of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean which all have agreed to respect?

This point is sufficiently interesting to merit examination and study. But we do not want the matter discussed in Paris, where they are inclined to go to far-fetched arguments when they can do us harm, and where Treaties which impose limitations upon the French are declared to be of no importance.

We want the matter discussed in Rome, London, Berlin, Vienna, where the relaxation of these limitations and the repudiation of engagements may be considered a bad precedent, for there is the proverb, "Hodie mihi, cras tibi."

They talk of the impossibility of tolerating an equality of treatment for Italian and French goods. But why is this question limited to Italian goods? Putting aside England, who enjoys a Treaty, why do they not also talk of German, Austrian, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese goods?

The products of these countries are placed on an equality with those of France, and be it observed by those opposed to us, or more particularly by those who wish to study the question, that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Holland, Spain, and Portugal

have no stipulations of any kind which have been denounced, or which will be denounced.

The French seem to forget the existence of what are known as the Capitulations, stipulations agreed to in the distant past to regulate the position of Europeans in the Levant, and which so far as they relate to the Regency, are solemnly re-affirmed by the fundamental Pact of 1857.

Italy enjoys the advantages granted by the Capitulations, which were confirmed by the fundamental Pact of 1857. Other nations have not yet had occasion to raise this question, but Italy has, and she has specially drawn the attention of France to her rights and international position in Tunis. Yet see what the "Matin" and M. Beaulieu are saying.

When, in 1884, we consented, to please our neighbours, who now treat us with so much dishonesty, to suspend not the Capitulations, but simply Consular jurisdiction which existed under them, we insisted that, in the Protocol which dealt with the matter, apart from various other reserves (many of which have been violated), the following two should be clearly affirmed:—

1. That the "suspension" should be merely temporary, as it was granted merely as an experiment.

2. That, in granting this, Italy formally reserved to herself all the other privileges and concessions which she enjoyed under the Capitulations.

Now anything may happen in this world, the most solemn international obligations, Treaties and Conventions may be torn up and thrown into one's face. But what cannot happen is that those who receive the injury should forget that they also possess something which they can hurl in the faces of their assailants.

What would they say in France if Italy were to declare the "experiment" over and not satisfactory, and denounced in consequence the Protocol of 1884, relative to Consular jurisdiction, and demanded a return to the *status quo ante*, as she has a right to do?

This demand may lead the French to hesitate, and, under the circumstances, the demand cannot be considered unreasonable. In it we will find a defence for our most sacred rights, and it would be a good thing if our statesmen were to let the possibility of this demand being made be heard from, from which a disturbance of our sacred rights on the shores of the Mediterranean may come.

No. 53.

Mr. Howard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 268.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 16, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 265 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that it is announced in all the newspapers that M. Hanotaux yesterday informed the Council of Ministers that a note denouncing the Italian Treaty with Tunis of 1868 had been delivered by the French Chargé d'Affaires at Rome to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in that capital.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY HOWARD

No. 54.

Mr. Edwards to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 142.)

My Lord,

Rome, August 20, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 140 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Signor Massa, Chief Director of the Italian Foreign Office, told me yesterday that the Italian Government had now received from the French Embassy here the formal notification that the Government of the Bey of Tunis had the intention of denouncing the Italo-Tunisian Treaty on the 29th September next, the date by which the denunciation must be made if the Treaty is not to be renewed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. G. EDWARDS.

No. 55.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Tunis, August 18, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have just received word from the Italian Agent here (Consul General) that he has just received a note from the French Délégué denouncing, on behalf of the Beylical Government, the Italo-Tunisian Treaty of 1868.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 56.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Edwards.

(No. 21. Commercial. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, August 24, 1895.

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador informed me on the 17th instant that the French Charge d'Affaires at Rome had on the 15th of the month denounced the Treaty of Commerce between Italy and Tunis, which was signed in 1868, and that Her Majesty's Government would maintain the most-favoured-nation clause, and particularly that Great Britain would maintain the most-favoured-nation clause.

Consul General has been informed, and he has replied that Her Majesty's Government would be unable to refuse to discuss proposals for the revision of the British Treaty, as this was expressly provided for in Article XL.

Her Majesty's Government will be only too ready to communicate to the Italian Government any proposals that may be made, and to inform them of any changes which Great Britain might be disposed to make in the Treaty.

His Excellency was also informed that I had no present intention of altering the most-favoured-nation clause, and thought it most improbable that any British Government would do so.

I am, &c.
(Signed) SALISBURY

No. 57.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

Tunis, August 11, 1895.

My Lord,

IN the course of a conversation which I held last night with the Italian Agent and Consul General, he told me that it was generally considered that the port of Bizerta was likely to prove a complete failure, both commercially and from a naval point of view, specially in consequence of the danger of the current, and that, consequently, the very large sums already spent there may be considered as practically thrown away.

As Signor Macchiavelli has very exceptional means of information, I have thought it would be worth your Lordship's consideration if the views which I have had the honour of expressing in former despatches.

Signor Macchiavelli further told me that the large sums spent on the port here have been to a great extent wasted. He added that lately the French authorities had consulted an eminent Italian engineer, who had told him that to be of any use they must spend at least 20,000,000* more, and that that would be only the first instalment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, August 11, 1895.

DURING the conversation to which I have had the honour of alluding in my immediately preceding despatch, the Italian Agent and Consul-General informed me that he had heard that the question of the denunciation of their Treaty was being actively discussed with the view of certain modifications being proposed. He said that these discussions were kept very secret, but that he had himself little doubt that the Treaty would be denounced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. MAGGARD

353

Colonel-General Haygard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 4.)

(No. 35. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Twice, August 12, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have heard that some French ships of war have lately paid a visit to the Gulf of Bon Grara, the bay in the south of Tunisia, the entrance to which is so admirably protected by the Island of Djerba. They are reported to have occupied themselves in taking soundings, &c.

M. Riffault, the French Chargé d'Affaires, also took a trip there last week, and "Hirondelle," the dispatch-boat attached to the Residency

These visits may perhaps account for, or at least give colour to, the prevalent idea that the French idea of making a naval port there, in the extreme south of the Peninsula, Azores being in the extreme north—may be taking shape; and, should the latter prove the failure which now seems possible, they may perhaps be even more anxious to have a port with the great natural advantage that Ilou Graa would seem to offer.

It is suggested that the α factor which may influence the

a factor which may influence the
 school system. The school system
 is a factor which may influence the

enormous expense of constructing an artificial harbour
the natural port is nothing but an exposed roadstead

Mr. Drummond-Hay reported on this matter in his despatch No. 41 of the 8 September, 1891; and in his No. 35 of the 6th June, 1892, referred to the expropriation by the Tunisian Government of 123 hectares of land for the maritime establishment of the port.

Signed, _____ W. H. D. HARRIS, A.L.D.

No. 450

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 47)

My Lord,

Tunis, September 3, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an article published in the "Dépêche Tunisienne," which is interesting, from a strategical point of view, specially when calling attention to the fact of the change in the railway gauge, which is at present made at Hammamel-Laf, about 10 miles from Tunis, but which is intended to be effected at Tunis itself, being likely to cause difficulties in the possible event of the necessity of moving troops.

I have, &c
(Signed) W. H. D. HAUGARD

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of August 31, 1895.

T. A. MISOLOJEV, Z. I. PAVLOV, I. S. HARMANET, N. A. FLORE

4

Le Nouveau Réseau en Point de Vue stratégique.

POUR qui consulte une carte et surtout parcourt le pays, l'adoption de la voie d'un mètre à partir de Tunis pour joindre le réseau qui jusqu'alors s'arrêtait à Alger et qui doit servir, le cas échéant, au XIX^e Corps d'Armée venant renforcer la Division de Constantine, semble difficile à admettre. Cette question a du reste fait l'objet de nombreuses discussions à la Commission et a été l'objet d'une séance extraordinaire de la Commission le 10 juillet 1892, où plusieurs membres ont soutenu, non sans logique, qu'il fallait continuer le même écartement de voie jusqu'à Hammamet.

La Presqu'île du Cap Hon.

En effet, quel que soit le plan de défense de la Tunisie, plan que naturellement

proqu'il soit une sorte de bras tendu, à travers la mer, vers l'Asie Mineure, pour servir d'appui à nos armées et à nos flottes. L'Italie fertile, couverte de massifs montagneux, également bons pour la défense et pour l'attaque, nous offre un terrain favorable à ces opérations. Le Pape Major italien, qui voudra probablement y envoyer quelques divisions de la Sicile et du sud de l'Italie que la longueur du transport ne lui permettrait pas de diriger vers le Péloponnèse et les Alpes en temps utile.

C'est dans l'espoir de pouvoir faire fête un jour à ses compatriotes que vit la population de la région. Les habitants de la région, en effet, ont été les premiers à se rendre compte que les troupes italiennes, en débarquant, ont apporté avec elles, pour les besoins de leur campagne, une quantité considérable de matériel. C'est pourquoi on s'est mis à avoir sous la main, dès la première nouvelle de leur débarquement, une quantité raisonnable de wagons empruntés au réseau central pour en jeter, sans transbordement, tout le contenu à l'entrée de la région menacée. Pour la même raison, le Golfe d'Hamamet étant particulièrement propre à un débarquement, il eût été désirable que nos troupes, venant non seulement de Tunis mais encore d'Algérie, pussent s'y porter rapidement et, avec elles, le matériel nécessaire.

En cas de Guerre avec l'Italie

A tellement nous aurons la guerre avec l'Italie—ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise—que nous nous trouverions dans la nécessité de transporter nos troupes à Hama et Laif, où les hangars, les quais et autres installations font défaut. Supposons la possibilité d'envoyer par le canal de Suez des trains militaires pour alimenter l'état-major français sans que ces trains soient bloqués au passage par les troupes aux quelques wagons attribués à la voie étroite. Nous ne parlons pas de la capacité de ces wagons, car ils auront, conformément à la Circulaire du Ministre de la Guerre, une capacité de 60 tonnes et seront par conséquent bloqués par les troupes ennemies qui ont une capacité de 100 tonnes. On sera donc obligé d'attendre le moment où l'ennemi se retirera de Tunis et de les envoyer par étapes au point de contact, d'où une perte de temps considérable, qui se traduira aussi par une perte d'hommes, l'effort que l'on sera obligé de faire pour déloger l'ennemi devant être plus pénible.

Voie Large et Voie Etroite, la Carte à Payer.

[illegible]

L'état de nos finances ne nous permettait pas ce luxe, il eût peut-être été à souhaiter que la Métropole, qui a dans la Tunisie un des plus beaux fleurons de son Empire Colonial payât, sous forme de quote-part, la différence de prix qui existe entre l'application de la voie large et celle de la voie étroite sur Hammamet et le Cap Bon.

Cette différence n'était pas au surplus bien considérable ; à voir large le kilomètre devait coûter environ 80.000 fr. (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) (144) (145) (146) (147) (148) (149) (150) (151) (152) (153) (154) (155) (156) (157) (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) (169) (170) (171) (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) (177) (178) (179) (180) (181) (182) (183) (184) (185) (186) (187) (188) (189) (190) (191) (192) (193) (194) (195) (196) (197) (198) (199) (200) (201) (202) (203) (204) (205) (206) (207) (208) (209) (210) (211) (212) (213) (214) (215) (216) (217) (218) (219) (220) (221) (222) (223) (224) (225) (226) (227) (228) (229) (230) (231) (232) (233) (234) (235) (236) (237) (238) (239) (240) (241) (242) (243) (244) (245) (246) (247) (248) (249) (250) (251) (252) (253) (254) (255) (256) (257) (258) (259) (260) (261) (262) (263) (264) (265) (266) (267) (268) (269) (270) (271) (272) (273) (274) (275) (276) (277) (278) (279) (280) (281) (282) (283) (284) (285) (286) (287) (288) (289) (290) (291) (292) (293) (294) (295) (296) (297) (298) (299) (300) (301) (302) (303) (304) (305) (306) (307) (308) (309) (310) (311) (312) (313) (314) (315) (316) (317) (318) (319) (320) (321) (322) (323) (324) (325) (326) (327) (328) (329) (330) (331) (332) (333) (334) (335) (336) (337) (338) (339) (340) (341) (342) (343) (344) (345) (346) (347) (348) (349) (350) (351) (352) (353) (354) (355) (356) (357) (358) (359) (360) (361) (362) (363) (364) (365) (366) (367) (368) (369) (370) (371) (372) (373) (374) (375) (376) (377) (378) (379) (380) (381) (382) (383) (384) (385) (386) (387) (388) (389) (390) (391) (392) (393) (394) (395) (396) (397) (398) (399) (400) (401) (402) (403) (404) (405) (406) (407) (408) (409) (410) (411) (412) (413) (414) (415) (416) (417) (418) (419) (420) (421) (422) (423) (424) (425) (426) (427) (428) (429) (430) (431) (432) (433) (434) (435) (436) (437) (438) (439) (440) (441) (442) (443) (444) (445) (446) (447) (448) (449) (450) (451) (452) (453) (454) (455) (456) (457) (458) (459) (460) (461) (462) (463) (464) (465) (466) (467) (468) (469) (470) (471) (472) (473) (474) (475) (476) (477) (478) (479) (480) (481) (482) (483) (484) (485) (486) (487) (488) (489) (490) (491) (492) (493) (494) (495) (496) (497) (498) (499) (500) (501) (502) (503) (504) (505) (506) (507) (508) (509) (510) (511) (512) (513) (514) (515) (516) (517) (518) (519) (520) (521) (522) (523) (524) (525) (526) (527) (528) (529) (530) (531) (532) (533) (534) (535) (536) (537) (538) (539) (540) (541) (542) (543) (544) (545) (546) (547) (548) (549) (550) (551) (552) (553) (554) (555) (556) (557) (558) (559) (560) (561) (562) (563) (564) (565) (566) (567) (568) (569) (570) (571) (572) (573) (574) (575) (576) (577) (578) (579) (580) (581) (582) (583) (584) (585) (586) (587) (588) (589) (590) (591) (592) (593) (594) (595) (596) (597) (598) (599) (600) (601) (602) (603) (604) (605) (606) (607) (608) (609) (610) (611) (612) (613) (614) (615) (616) (617) (618) (619) (620) (621) (622) (623) (624) (625) (626) (627) (628) (629) (630) (631) (632) (633) (634) (635) (636) (637) (638) (639) (640) (641) (642) (643) (644) (645) (646) (647) (648) (649) (650) (651) (652) (653) (654) (655) (656) (657) (658) (659) (660) (661) (662) (663) (664) (665) (666) (667) (668) (669) (670) (671) (672) (673) (674) (675) (676) (677) (678) (679) (680) (681) (682) (683) (684) (685) (686) (687) (688) (689) (690) (691) (692) (693) (694) (695) (696) (697) (698) (699) (700) (701) (702) (703) (704) (705) (706) (707) (708) (709) (710) (711) (712) (713) (714) (715) (716) (717) (718) (719) (720) (721) (722) (723) (724) (725) (726) (727) (728) (729) (730) (731) (732) (733) (734) (735) (736) (737) (738) (739) (740) (741) (742) (743) (744) (745) (746) (747) (748) (749) (750) (751) (752) (753) (754) (755) (756) (757) (758) (759) (760) (761) (762) (763) (764) (765) (766) (767) (768) (769) (770) (771) (772) (773) (774) (775) (776) (777) (778) (779) (780) (781) (782) (783) (784) (785) (786) (787) (788) (789) (790) (791) (792) (793) (794) (795) (796) (797) (798) (799) (800) (801) (802) (803) (804) (805) (806) (807) (808) (809) (810) (811) (812) (813) (814) (815) (816) (817) (818) (819) (820) (821) (822) (823) (824) (825) (826) (827) (828) (829) (830) (831) (832) (833) (834) (835)

En faisant les calculs sur ce plan, et finalement construit au près de l'être, on a 22 Tiers à Nîmes. 58 km pour 900 + 13 kilom. 500 pour l'embranchement de Mende, au total 72 km. En arrondissant les chiffres, cette partie de notre réseau nous coûte 750.000 fr. à voie large il nous eût coûté dans les 4.500.000 fr., c'est-à-dire 700.000 fr. de plus. L'avenir démontrera si la France n'aurait pas mieux fait de nous faire cet apport.

La question, par exemple, se complique d'une singulière façon si on raisonne sur les tracés actuels adoptés—on sait avec quelle peine !—Faire la voie large de Tunis à Anhoult s'eût été parfait mais devant le fait accompli, il faut commencer à vous atteler à l'ar-Rou-Kous, qui est tout près de Sousse et rouble à celle de Tunis.

D'un côté se dresse la question d'argent, de l'autre, l'obligation de transborder également les transports stratégiques allant sur Soudan.

Tout bien considéré, étant donné qu'il aurait fallu changer des tracés depuis longtemps débattus ou continuer le sacrifice pendant les 90 kilom. que l'on a traversés Bir-Bou-Bokba de la capitale du Sahel, on a renoncé au bénéfice de la voie interrompue, et l'autorité militaire s'est résignée en trouvant dans Tunis à la fin de l'année terminus du réseau à 1'44 m. et la tête de ligne de celui à 1 mètre, ce qui simplifie les graphiques.

La Surveillance de la Foie

Il nous reste à parler des craintes que nous avons vu exprimer devant nous touchant la sécurité de la voie qui longe la mer à peu de distance. Ici on nous a dit spécialement qu'il convenait que le gendarme qui se promène sur la plage ne soit pas l'objet, nous les craignons, d'un attentat de la part d'un ennemi du pays.

« Nous ne nous voyons pas de de... possible, avec la portée des
pièces et les... nous dont...
que l'ennemi... nous...
de la batterie de Rhazes...
craignons pas davantage... »

et que rendrait certainement très entreprenants une descente de leurs nationaux à Kolibia.

[illegible][illegible]

Pour remédier à tout cela nous voudrions voir quelques ouvrages établis à Kefibou.

à Hammamet et quelque part au Khangiet non pas les forts d'arrêt qui coûtent des millions, mais des installations suffisantes pour empêcher les coups de main et tenir le pays et ses habitants respect, enfin nous pensons qu'on doit se hâter de pousser jusqu'à Kelibia.

Les Français au Cap Bon en 1702.

Vous ne pouviez quitter, on le comprendra, cette intéressante région du Cap Bon sans dire un mot de la situation géographique de l'île. L'heure venue, sur ce sujet traité, des mesures qui nous paraissent absolument nécessaires à sa défense, cette partie de la Régence doit nous tenir d'autant plus à cœur, que dès 1702, c'est la correspondance des Rois de Tunis avec la Cour de France qui nous l'apprend et était confectionnée en France.

En de nos combattantes, le Sieur Bourguet, avait reçu à perpétuité du Bey et du Divan de Tunis, une concession de terrain de 700 pas de long sur 100 pas de large, les limites de la concession étaient tout le Cap Bon jusqu'à Sfax

Ce fut que le nom Français a des lettres de noblesse déjà vénérables dans le pays, et si la ~~noblesse~~ ~~noblesse~~ ~~est~~ ~~devenue~~ ~~une~~ ~~partie~~ ~~du~~ ~~pays~~, ~~elle~~ ~~a~~ ~~été~~ ~~la~~ ~~cause~~ ~~de~~ ~~sa~~ ~~dégradation~~. On verrait, par d'autres contes encore de la liegèreté à quel point est la vanité des drôles.

No. 61.

Council-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 08, Confidential.)

Tunis, September 8, 1895.

IN an article published in the "Dépêche Tunisiennne," the organ of the Residency, allusion is made to the fact that the native troops had been sent to the Tonquin or the Madagascar expedition. In opposition to this decision, the "Dépêche" uses as an argument the fact that the Egyptian troops from India: "dont le Protectorat a servi de modèle au régime politique et militaire appliqué à la Tunisie."

The "Dépêche," however, goes on to console itself with the reflection that, as three troops of the 1st ~~Troop~~ ~~of the 11th Spahis~~ ~~Troop~~ of the 11th Spahis. These troops will be employed this year in the maneuvers shortly to take place in Algiers, there will be henceforward no reason why they should not take part also in colonial expeditions.

quest, which was a result of the popularity of French films, and I was very surprised. As I said in the 1976 Memoir, the threat of the flood was the reason why I believe, to prevent a riot on his arrival, I accompanied him to his journey, which I accompanied him to prevent his being actually hunted out of the place where he made the announcement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HARGARD

No. 02

Congress-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 00.)

Tues. September 11, 1895.

My Lord, IN my despatch No. 54 of the 11th July I had the honour of inclosing a copy of an advertisement from the French to draw attention to the intention of removing all French soldiers from the hospitals some years back of the date of our first sending troops to the post of Sebastopol, the necessary I perceived to which had nearly been forgotten, and I have now the honour to state to

No. 41

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received September 29.)

(No. 71. Confidential.)

My Lord,

THUR. September 18, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 67 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in conversation with Mr. Prof. M. the British Vice-Consul, M. Dobler, the Chef du Cabinet of the Resident, stated, on his incidentally touching upon the question of the Southern Railways and their strategical importance, that according to the present scheme of defence, in view of an attack by a foreign Power, these would be very little considered, as it was intended to abandon absolutely and entirely to its fate the southern part of the Regency, all available resources being concentrated on the defence of the northern part of the Regency as far as Cape Bon and probably Hammamet, where it was possible that a fortress might be constructed, if it was finally decided to include this part in the plan of defence.

He added that in any event the defence would not extend beyond the confines of Zaghouan. All troops in the south would be recalled at once, the only object of their presence being to keep the natives quiet, and in the event of foreign attack they would be treated as a "quantité négligeable." It may, however, be remarked that, in that case, the probability is that those tribes, seeing the French troops withdrawn, would rise as they did in 1881 on the French troops being called back on the signing of the Treaty of Kasr-Said, when the campaign had to be entirely gone through a second time, this possibility is, therefore, all the greater if they see their "protectors" withdrawn with a foreign army, and they can muster many thousands of hardy fighters for any force to some purpose.

The reason for the abandonment of the south is that it would be impossible to provision an army save from the north, and the north is too small to support a large army, being very heavily forested.

view to the rapid mobilization of troops at any particular spot in the north, there is a system of communication by means of signalling-stations provided with "signes" (I presume), by which the operators are enabled to communicate with the greatest ease. The central station is situated at Zouara, 100 miles south of Kairuan, Sfax, Susa, Gabes, and in the north at Tunis. A northern branch is to be extended to Annaba and Algeria. It is particularly useful for noting the movements of the native tribes.

Talking about the improvements in artillery, M. Dobler said that the cannon mounted in all the fortresses in Tunis were fitted with a mechanism which guarantees absolute accuracy of fire in the case of stationary guns. This he called a "lupine" which appears to be a rather arrangement by means of which the aim is taken, and as soon as this has been exactly found, the gun is discharged.

I have, &c
W. H. D. Haggard.

32

(No. 72, Confidential.)

True September 14, 1995

I cannot myself forget the various remarks made by the French Resident during his journey on the southern border in the spring, on which I accompanied him, with the object of acquiring information as to those regions, and French movements and designs in that direction. These remarks were of a very candid nature, and pointed to M. Millet's

1414]

and arsenal is only to be secured by a further enormous expenditure in addition to the outlay on the very extensive and expensive works already made. If money all other-wise have been wasted, and, if that further outlay be met, two problems will still remain unsolved: (1) whether the new works will be efficacious in destroying the current; (2) if they are, whether Bizerta will have justified the enormous expense necessary to make it of any use at all, save, perhaps, as a torpedo-boat station. It may therefore well happen that the ultimate result of the violation by France of her engagement may be that Bizerta may turn out to be a source of weakness rather than of the aggressive strength so confidently, and prematurely, expected.

The article which I have the honour to inclose is more moderate than the views which I see constantly expressed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 67.

Vice-Consul Profert to Consul-General Haggard.

Sir,

Tunis [undated].

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, in accordance with your instructions, I visited Bizerta, and beg to submit herewith such information about the canal and other points of interest as I was able to obtain.

I ascertained that the rock, which prevented the French fleet from entering the Lake of Bizerta through the canal, had only 5 metres of water over it, and reduced its width navigable for large vessels to 37 metres—the total bottom width of the canal being 64 metres.

On examination of the spot indicated to me as being the place where blasting operations had been most recently carried on, and as the position of the rock, I found that it had lain in close proximity to the small inlet, marked C in the plan annexed,* which is used for repairing the boats and dredgers of the Port Company; measured along the right bank of the canal from the extremity G of the small guide pier, the rocky stratum commences at a distance of about 550 metres, and is said at one time to have extended for about 100 metres in breadth along the right-hand bank from the point C, gradually increasing in width in the same direction towards the left bank. It was reported that the rock was removed at the time of the visit of the French fleet, leaving only a small section near the point P, sufficient, however, to reduce the passage to the dimensions above mentioned.

On the departure of the fleet, strenuous endeavours were made to remove the impediment and reduce the main waterway to the required depth of 9½ metres, and it is now asserted that this has been effected, and that the canal is 9½ metres deep along its entire centre for a breadth of about 64 metres.

In proof of the probability of this assertion being true, it may be remarked that all operations have now ceased, that the workmen, beyond those indispensable for the care and maintenance of the machinery, have been dismissed, and further, that the Port Company have advertised for sale the main part of the machinery used in the construction of the port and canal, a step which would seem to show that, as far as the Company is concerned, the work is completed. The only work, indeed, which is now being carried out is the completion of the lighthouse on the extremity of the eastern jetty, that on the northern being finished, though not yet in actual use.

With reference to the current which exists in the canal, I found that it was very considerable force, having, as it appeared, a strong tendency to flow towards the extremity of the canal.

On proceeding up the canal to the point where the ferry-boat crosses, I found, by comparison with a piece of wood floating past, that at this spot the current ran at least twice as fast as I could walk, i.e., at about 8 miles an hour, and I was, moreover, informed that it was comparatively slight on this particular day.

I further learnt that in the months of December, January, and February the counter-current from the Lake of Bizerta is so strong that it entirely overpowers the sea current, and has on more than one occasion carried out to sea the steam ferry-boat, breaking the steel hawser by which it is kept in position. This current is due to the great rise which takes place in the lake during the rainy season, and especially to the

* Not printed.

volume of water which is carried into it by the Tinja from the Lake Ishkel, which is the reservoir for an important watershed of Northern Tunis. So great is then the extra volume of water in the lake that it occasionally causes a rise of nearly 2½ feet in the canal.

As a means of preventing, or at least nullifying to a great extent, the evils of the sea current it was rumoured that the harbour jetty was to be at once extended, but apparently nothing has yet been done towards the realization of this scheme. The general opinion, indeed, appears to be that this would not be sufficient, but that it will be necessary, in order to counteract the current, to construct a semi-circular breakwater in front of the entrance, and at the same time to reduce the breadth of the inlet from 420 metres to about 300 metres.

It is, however, recognized that this would be a work of great difficulty owing to the depth, which is more than 20 metres, entailing, moreover, an enormous outlay, and it would appear that the Port Company are not at all disposed to engage in such a large execution of works which are considered to be necessary in order to render the entrance safe in all weathers. The belief, too, is gaining ground in Bizerta that a mistake has been made in extending the canal, and that it ought to have been at least twice its present breadth, specially in view of the existence of the current, which had not been sufficiently taken account of.

As to the ultimate destiny of Bizerta, it is at present rumoured that active negotiations are being carried on between the Bizerta Port Company and the French Government—behind which is France—for the sale of the harbour works. The reasons adduced for this step are:—

1. That the probability of Bizerta becoming an important commercial harbour is remote.

2. That in order to make the harbour as perfect as possible, it will be necessary to expend enormous sums, such as would be more fitly supported by a Government than a Company.

3. That the idea of a commercial harbour is exploded, and that the time has now come for showing the real object of Bizerta, viz., a naval port of the first order.

It may be worth noting that the Deputy Merton, who is here to report on Tunis, said that the object of the French Government in extending the canal was to make the port deeper than those of any harbour in the Mediterranean, and endeavour to sell coal to steamers at rates below Algiers and Malta.

It is also stated that a great deal of work has been made in the fortifications of Bizerta. The fort of Dar-el-Congia is a new work, and is armed with 11 quick-firing guns, while on the old Fort d'El-Bahia, which is connected with the former, four quick-firing guns are mounted. The fort of Dar-el-Congia is still in a very unfinished state, and it will require several months to complete unless proceeded with with greater energy and activity than at present.

The idea of erecting two further fortresses on Cape Blanc and Cape Zebid is, I understand, still adhered to.

The construction of the "pare d'attraction," for which a strip of land on the right-hand bank of the canal is to be taken, for the repair of torpedo-boats is placed, was lately expropriated, and declared a military zone, has up to the present not been undertaken, but building operations on several private houses—two more than half built—have been stopped by the military authorities, a source of much discontent in Bizerta, for the town is now so hemmed in by military zones that a great development is scarcely possible, and apparently not desired by the military authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) R. A. PROFERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 67.

Extract from the "Dépêche Tunisienne" of October 1, 1895.

LE 4 Juin dernier, l'Escadre de la Méditerranée, commandée par l'Amiral de la Joubert, composée de six cuirassés, de six croiseurs, prenait leur mouillage à un mille environ de la côte, les avisos-torpilleurs "Lagou" et "Léon" étant mouillés à l'ancre devant Bizerte.

Leurs journaux ont subi une rature ce qu'ils ont appelé la brusque transformation

Malheureusement les règles du droit international s'opposent à cette mesure et il faut les respecter. Protectorat n'est pas an

But, according to my informant, when this appointment was made, it was forgotten that it entailed all sorts of other changes. For instance, the presence of a General of Division entails that of a Brigadier-General under him, who, with his staff, has to be paid, while the salaries of the officers on the staff of a General of Division are larger than those of members of the staff of a Brigadier-General. The scale, in fact, of pay and position, as well as the number of staff posts, has to be increased all round, and, now that it

is realized that a very large extra expenditure will be the result of what was hoped would be a quiet little job, my informant says that it is thought that the Ministry of War may be afraid of an inquiry of the "Chambre," and (General Lee etc. etc. etc. transferred to another post) may restore the Tunis detachment of troops to its former position as a brigade.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 69

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 12)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Tunis, October 21, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to enclose an extract from the French "Journal des Chambres de Commerce," published in the "Dépêche Tunisienne," on the subject of an alleged letter from your Lordship to the Marquess of Salisbury, in reference to the Anglo-Tunisian Treaty, which is said to have been published in the newspapers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 69.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" of October 21, 1895

ON lit dans le dernier numéro du "Journal des Chambres de Commerce":—

"MANCHESTER.—LA DÉNONCIATION DU TRAITÉ ITALO-TUNISIEN. En prévision de l'expiration prochaine du Traité Italo-Tunisien le Secrétaire de la Chambre de Commerce de Manchester a écrit au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, le Marquis de Salisbury, pour lui demander si le Traité Anglo-Tunisien de 1876 n'accordait pas aux produits Britanniques le même traitement qu'aux produits Français en Tunisie, et si, dans l'éventualité d'une réduction de droits sur les importations Françaises, cette réduction ne serait pas appliquée également aux importations Anglaises dans ce pays.

"S'il faut s'en référer à une information reproduite par la presse Parisienne, le Chef du Foreign Office aurait répondu 'qu'aux termes de l'Article VII du Traité Anglo-Tunisien les droits d'entrée sur les produits Anglais ne doivent pas excéder 3 pour cent *ad valorem*, et que, d'ailleurs, les produits Anglais, bénéficiant de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, obtiendraient le même traitement que les produits similaires Français, franchise absolue, si, comme on l'annonce, la France est sur le point de négocier l'Union Douanière avec l'Italie.

"Notons que les deux puissances qui régissent notre Protectorat Tunisien.

La France, dit la "Poste," de par le Traité de Kassar-Said n'occupe pas seulement dans la Régence, tant au point de vue économique qu'au point de vue politique, une situation de suzerain, elle y possède une situation de droit, à laquelle nulle autre ne saurait être comparée. Nous ne sommes pas à Tunis la nation la plus favorisée, nous sommes l'État Protecteur.

"Nous avons assumé toutes les charges de ce titre, et comment n'en aurions-nous pas les privilèges? La France a garanti la dette Tunisienne, notre Protectorat a été reconnu par toutes les Grandes Puissances, et si l'Italie seule conteste aujourd'hui le fait, la Grande-Bretagne ne saurait, elle, renier sa propre signature.

"Nous rappelons récemment les dépêches diplomatiques de Lord Salisbury qui lèvent tous les doutes à cet égard.

"Reconnaissant le fait, comment le noble Marquis pourrait-il discuter le droit? Il lui faudrait avoir oublié, dans son désir de rassurer les négociants de Manchester, toutes les conséquences naturelles, fatales qu'entraîne tout Protectorat, et notamment un Protectorat aussi étroit, aussi complet que celui qui nous relie à la Régence. Cela est impossible à admettre.

"Le Marquis de Salisbury n'est pas de l'école de ces diplomates de l'autre siècle, auxquels Georges III reprochait de ne pas savoir ce qu'ils faisaient. Il n'est pas le Vatel et n'ignore rien du droit public.

"Et, d'autre part, il est trop avisé pour soulever de nouveaux litiges entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne, à l'heure où la diplomatie de ces deux pays s'applique, non sans peine, à régler les anciens.

"Les Puissances Européennes seraient d'ailleurs mal inspirées en élevant systématiquement des obstacles pour empêcher la France de recueillir le fruit de ses efforts, le juste prix de ses sacrifices, et d'exercer en paix, conformément aux Traités, les prérogatives légitimes de son titre dans la Régence. Le Gouvernement de la République qui a voulu jusqu'ici ménager toutes les susceptibilités, même les moins naturelles, serait obligé de ne plus prendre conseil que de ses intérêts et de ses droits, et rechercherait, afin de mettre un terme à toutes les chicanes et à toutes les controverses internationales, la formule la plus propre à combler les prétendues lacunes de l'organisation politique actuelle."

Annex.

Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 16, 1895.

IN reply to your letter of the 7th instant, I am directed by the Marquess of Salisbury to transmit to you a copy of the Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and Tunis. It will be observed that, under Article VII, the import duties on British produce are not to exceed 3 per cent *ad valorem*, and that British produce is moreover entitled to most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to import duties, and, therefore, to the duties levied on French produce.

I am, &c.
(Signed) H. PERCY ANDERSON

No. 70

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 12)

(No. 80. Confidential)

My Lord,

Tunis, October 26, 1895.

HAVING no report from the Consular Agent at Bizerte, I have, in consequence, sent your Lordship a copy and translation of a letter from an organ here, giving an account of the injury done to the new harbour there by a mole which was lately completed. Presumably this was only the part above the sea; but in any case, if the "Union" be correct, it is a very serious injury which it will cost a great deal of money to repair, and probably, unless the structure is very much strengthened, it may happen again at any moment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

October 28.

P.S.—I enclose a copy and translation of Mr. Spezzichino's Report, which has just arrived. Your Lordship will observe that, without giving me the details, it differs considerably from the report in the "Union." Without further information, which I will endeavour to procure from some other source, it is impossible to say which of these reports is the most nearly correct. Possibly it will be safest to take both *cum grano salis*, as the correspondent of the "Union" may be influenced by his wish to depreciate as much as possible a French work, while Mr. Spezzichino may be influenced to a certain extent in the opposite sense, and may at the same time wish to excuse not having reported the circumstance at all. There is, however, probably something in what he says about the newness of the work affecting its stability.

* "Tunis No. 1 (1876)."

It would, however, seem impossible that the former should have reported so definitely the destruction of the boat unless it had not taken place. Mr. Spezzichino is, moreover, not accurate in alleging that the "Unione" states that the northern mole was injured. The wind was not from that direction.

W. E. D. H.

Inclosure 1 in No. 70.

Extract from the "Union."

(Translation.)

[illegible]

At the Custom-house, and thus I know for certain, 100 fr. have not been taken in. Really, what a situation! The people are in a state of depression, there is a regular stampede. This sorrowful and precarious situation is the dark and dismal consciousness that business is no longer the animation and movement that there is no future, expended what is down.

Inclosure 2 in No. 70

Mr. Spezzichino to Consul-General Haggard.

6. The relative humidity is 50%.

Biaarta Consular Agency, October 26, 1895.

IN reply to your despatch of the 25th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the damage to the jetty (south) caused by the storm of the 19th is not so important as is reported in the "Union;" I did not, therefore, think it necessary to report at once a matter of so little consequence.

It is true that the bad weather has done certain damage to the works of the jetty. But, inasmuch as this was completed during the past summer, it was certain that the first storms of the year would do a certain amount of injury to the works, as often happened to the northern jetty. This northern jetty has not suffered the least damage, contrary to the report of the "Union." I cannot conceal from you, also, that its correspondent is somewhat exaggerated in his articles against the Bizerta Port Company.

The works of the aforementioned southern jetty were not entirely completed, until the works are absolutely finished, and have had time to consolidate and settle down in their bed at the sea bottom.

I shall not fail in future to report anything of the least importance, as you desire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. S. SPEZZICHINO

No. 71.

Consul-General Hagood to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 81, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, October 30, 1895.

THE Italian Agent and Consul-General informed me yesterday that on the one or two occasions on which he has seen the Resident-General since his return he has found him so exceptionally amiable, that he is convinced that it is the result of a "mot d'ordre" given him in Paris. Amongst other things, he had expressed his admiration for the work done by some Sicilian labourers in a lately constructed vineyard which he had visited. "I will not disguise from you," he said, "that I should have preferred Frenchmen, but as we cannot get them we shall welcome gladly the laborious and sober Italian workmen."

This is a very different tone from that of a few months back, before M. Millet's journey to Paris, and would seem to argue that, possibly in view of the uncompromising attitude taken by the Italian Government with reference to the determination of the Treaty, the French Government are disposed to be conciliatory preparatory to, and possibly during, the forthcoming negotiations for the conclusion of a new Convention.

Mr. Mace have I told you that this subject came up several times between him and

I have, &c
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 72.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 82 Confidential)

My L 1,

Tulla, October 30, 1895.

The relative importance which can be attached to the inclosed cutting from the
 * depends on the source from which it comes.

That paper is the organ of the Resident. It may, indeed, in articles of this kind be said to be edited at the Residency.

When, therefore, the "Dépêche" corrects the Senator Leveur for saying that our Treaty with Tunis is in perpetuity by stating that, "according to international law, every Treaty without final limit is terminable by the denunciation which one or other of the interested parties may choose to make," it may be understood that the Republic is unofficially laying down this new and strange dictum of international law, *in se et contra* grounds—and simply sufficient in their eyes—for their asserting as a fact what they know to be a fiction, being that they wish that the positions were reversed.

I have therefore thought it worth while to trouble your Lordship with what might otherwise be considered as merely the editorial rubbish of a second-rate newspaper.

It may possibly interest your Lordship more to observe that the last few words of this article support M. Macchiavelli's surmise as to the intended policy of France in denouncing the Italian Treaty, of contriving, if possible, to isolate Italy, and show the vital importance to Italy, to which I have alluded in previous despatches, of our holding by our most-favoured-nation clause

I have, &c
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD

Inclosure in No. 72.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" of October 28, 1895

"L'ANGLETERRE et l'Italie en Tunisie."

Sous ce titre, la "Patrie" publie une assez longue interview qu'un de ses rédacteurs aurait eue avec M. Loeuwer, Sénateur de Constantine.

A cause de sa longueur et aussi parce qu'elle se borne à reproduire des idées déjà maintes fois émises, nous ne donnerons pas le texte *in extenso* de cette conversation.

Nous en extrayons seulement que l'Italie est mal venue à prétendre aujourd'hui qu'elle n'a jamais reconnu le Protectorat Français sur la Régence, puisqu'elle n'a

elle l'a reconnu maintes fois par l'acceptation théorique et pratique—même volontaire—de toute une série de mesures qui dépendent exclusivement de l'exercice de ce Protectorat.

Nous voulons relever encore ce que M. Lesueur aurait dû du Traité Anglo-Tunisien. Celui-là, fait-on dire au Sénateur de Constantine, contient aussi en faveur de l'Angleterre la clause de la nation la plus favorisée. Et il est d'autant plus dangereux que, si le Traité Italien doit prendre fin à date fixe, en 1896, le Traité Anglais, lui, conçu avec cette habileté spéciale dont les diplomates de la Grande-Bretagne ont donné tant de preuves, règle les relations de l'Angleterre et de la Tunisie sans limite de durée et engage la Tunisie à perpétuité.

C'est une erreur. En droit international, tout Traité, sans durée déterminée, prend fin par la dénonciation que prend soin d'en faire l'une ou l'autre des parties intéressées.

M. Lesueur nous paraît plus dans le vrai quand il ajoute, pour clore son entretien avec le rédacteur de la "Patrie." Mais les gouvernants Anglais sont gens très pratiques en affaires; il se pourrait donc qu'ils acceptassent une transaction sur le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée. Dans ce cas, le Gouvernement Italien, restant isolé, serait bien obligé d'en venir également à composition.

No. 73.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 63. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, October 30, 1895.

THE return of the Resident-General announced to your Lordship in my despatch No. 76 of the 15th instant has broken the summer calm, and a renewed general activity is noticeable in various directions.

This is reflected in the "Dépêche Tunisienne"—the Resident's organ—and the article from that paper which I have the honour to inclose will show one of these directions in which it is apparent.

One of the statements in this article is new to me—that in 1802 a Treaty was concluded with the Amenokal of the Imouchar at Ghadames, which opened to France the route to the Central Soudan.

It would seem that so far this alleged Treaty must have remained a dead letter, but there is no doubt but that the present French Resident-General here, at all events, wishes to supplement it by some tangible measures.

I have in previous despatches had the honour of showing the forms that these are likely to take, and I now hear that already some small caravans have passed from Ghadames to Ghat.

These caravans are only a beginning, and so far they have been unimportant and unremunerative, the most valuable commercial result and the most significant, as indicating the direction of the trade route, having been, as I hear, a single elephant's tusk, the money for which did not, however, as I learn, go into the pockets of the promoters of the enterprise, since the notorious renegade "General" Allegro—now French Governor of Ghat—made some pretext for carrying it off to Paris, whence neither it nor its price home, as I am told, returned.

So far we hear nothing more of "General" Allegro's scheme of an armed caravan to penetrate into the Soudan by Ghadames—which was to have started this autumn—about which he is said to have journeyed to Paris. Possibly the risk may have been considered too great at present, but it may still be in contemplation. Should I hear anything more about it, I will not fail to report it to your Lordship.

In the meanwhile, two Tuaregs have, during the last few days, arrived here. The first pretext given unofficially by the "Dépêche," for this was the old story that they had come to complain of and claim an indemnity for the aggressions on them of the Tunisian frontier tribes, but this is not considered to be better founded than was the mythical Kroumir invasion which led to the occupation of Tunis.

They are very closely watched and guarded, so, as I have found, it is quite impossible for anybody outside the Residency Agents to have any communication with them, and the fact that they are lodged with the Sheikh-el-Medina—the Spiritual Head of the Church in Tunis—would seem to indicate that considerable importance is attributed to their advent. A great deal of mystery is made about them, and one night—one does not quite see why—they were smuggled by a side door into the Residency instead of going in openly by day. It is said that they are going to Paris. If they do so I will inform your Lordship.

In any case, their presence even here would seem to indicate at least a wish to conciliate for some reason or other those scourges of the desert.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 73.

Extract from "La Dépêche Tunisienne" of October 28, 1895.

LA PÉNÉTRATION DU SAHARA ET L'ANGLETERRE.—Bien avant que la France ne sût installée dans l'Afrique du Nord, les Anglais, gens pratiques, avaient tout d'abord songé à se créer des points de repère sur la route qui conduisait aux Indes.

C'était alors à la fin du dix-huitième siècle.

Mais un homme avait vu le danger que courrait la France si la Grande-Bretagne prenait pied dans la Méditerranée.

Cet homme était un génie, c'était Bonaparte.

Pendant la campagne d'Italie (1796-97) il avait compris, déjà, que c'était en Egypte qu'il devait porter ses coups.

Mais par les batailles d'Aboukir et de Saint-Jean-d'Acre, l'Angleterre reprend l'avantage et, avec la ténacité qu'apporte cette nation dans ses entreprises coloniales, elle assied sa prépondérance sur la Méditerranée en prenant Malte, dont elle refuse de se dessaisir. (Paix d'Amiens.)

Éclairé sur les avantages que procureraient au commerce Français des relations suivies avec le Soudan, le Général Bonaparte avait écrit, en 1798, au Sultan du Bornou.

Aussi, dès le commencement du dix-neuvième siècle, alors que la France trop appauvrie ne pouvait inaugurer une politique coloniale en Afrique, voyons-nous les efforts des Anglais se porter sur la ligne Tripoli-Bornou (1817).

Mais lorsqu'en 1855, le Dr. Barth revint du Soudan, la prise d'Alger avait eu lieu vingt-cinq ans auparavant et le drapeau tricolore flottait aux confins du désert.

Si Hamza, Chef de la tribu des Ouled Sidi Cheikh, apportait à la France le vasselage du Touat et du Sahara jusqu'au Soudan (1856).

Un an plus tard, la Grande-Bretagne, abandonnant ses visées Tripolitaines, partit du Zanzibar pour découvrir les sources du Nil.

Pour répondre à la prise d'Alger, dont la conquête s'était effectuée malgré ses menaces, voyant que la France s'installait solidement dans l'Afrique du Nord, elle détermina la Turquie à prendre pied en Tripolitaine, espérant ainsi nous barrer la route de l'Egypte.

Mais l'œuvre Française continuait sans arrêt sa marche vers le sud.

Le Maréchal Randon pose un premier jalon sur la route du Soudan.

Au moment même où l'on plaçait les rails du chemin de fer d'Alger à Blidah, une première caravane, venue de Ghat, arrivait dans l'ancienne capitale des Deys.

L'idée de gagner le Soudan en traversant le Sahara prenait pied dans l'opinion, si bien qu'en 1858, un Commandant Supérieur de cercle pouvait écrire: "... et qui sait si un jour, reliant Alger à Tombouctou, la vapeur ne mettra pas les tropiques à six journées de Paris."

Le Maréchal Randon, Gouverneur de l'Algérie, se proposait alors de créer des relations commerciales avec le pays des nègres.

Une fois le courant des caravanes établi, son projet était de fonder des Agences Consulaires à Ghat, dans l'Air, à Tombouctou, au Touat, partout, enfin, où la présence d'un grand marché Africain pouvait nous intéresser.

C'est alors que l'on eut pour la première fois l'idée de la formation de troupes Sahariennes spéciales, chargées d'assurer la sécurité des transactions au désert.

La France vient seulement de mettre ce projet à exécution.

Pendant ce temps, nos vieux établissements du Sénégal prospéraient, la Colonie s'agrandissait et l'on pouvait bientôt prévoir un Empire Africain appartenant à la France et baigné à la fois par l'Atlantique et la Méditerranée.

Enfin, et pour entrer dans la voie d'exécution, un Traité signé en 1862 à Ghadames avec l'Amenokal des Imouchar, Si-el-Hadj Khenoukhen, nous ouvrit la route du Soudan Central.

C'est alors que l'Angleterre, effrayée de l'extension rapide de l'influence Française, sut nous faire accepter son alliance.

La France prit le contre-pied de sa ligne de conduite en Afrique. Elle commit des fautes, des imprudences, et la pénétration du Sahara, que l'on pensait chose presque accomplie, fut de nouveau rendue pour longtemps impossible.

Tel un voyageur dans le désert !

S'il poursuit sa route avec assurance, il rencontrera bientôt un puits où il pourra se désaltérer.

Mais si, la bouche en feu, il se laisse, pour apaiser sa soif, prendre à un mirage trompeur qui lui montre au loin des oasis aux palmiers verdoyants, dont les pansches immobiles se reflètent dans des eaux limpides, alors il est perdu et l'immensité lui sert de tombeau dans un linceul de sable.

Or, dans toutes les difficultés Africaines qu'elle a eues, la France a pu constater l'influence d'une main Anglaise.

Au Maroc et dans le Touat notre prépondérance a été combattue et, si les établissements Anglais de la côte Mauresque ne sont pas devenus florissants, ils n'en ont pas moins gravement gêné notre marche en avant.

Lorsque la "Royal Niger Company" fut créée, l'Angleterre se flattait hautement d'arriver au Bornou.

Il fallut en rabattre.

Cependant, quel que soit le but que la Grande-Bretagne semble assigner à ses agissements en Afrique, quelque couleur qu'elle cherche à donner à ses expéditions, le but qu'elle vise apparaît clairement aux yeux de l'Europe.

La fameuse expédition du Soudan Oriental, les voyages de Stanley à la recherche d'Emin Pacha, qui n'était pas perdu, le bombardement d'Alexandrie et cette mainmise sur l'Egypte, qu'était-ce tout cela, si ce n'est l'exécution de la première partie d'un plan démesurément grandiose, la fondation d'un immense Empire Africain s'étendant de l'Egypte au Cap ?

Le rôle important qu'aurait pu jouer la "Royal Niger Company" est terminé.

Ne pouvant s'avancer jusqu'au Tsad par l'ouest, les Anglais ont voulu y aller par l'est et ils se sont empressés de délimiter par des frontières les possessions voisines, tandis qu'ils s'attribuaient la part du lion.

L'arrangement avec l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, n'était-ce pas une façon habile de lui assigner des frontières, en devant la pilule ?

La prise de possession de l'Uganda et la conquête de l'Unyoro, que suivra bien certainement une mainmise sur les provinces Equatoriales, ne sont que des détails dans l'ensemble du projet, mais n'en constituent pas moins des points de repère indiquant clairement la route suivie par l'influence Anglaise.

Bientôt les Mahdistes, qui ont infligé à l'Angleterre un sanglant échec, se trouvant encadrés de toutes parts, seront à leur tour anéantis ou vaincus.

Du côté du Tchad nous voyons un esclave, renommé, il est vrai, pour sa bravoure et son intelligence, apparaître subitement à la tête de bandes armées de fusils à tir rapide et qui, se ruant sur le Bornou, déposent le Sultan qui y régnait et pénètrent dans Kouka, le Paris du Soudan Central.

Ne pourrait-on pas voir là une manifestation de la puissance Anglaise, surtout si l'on songe que Rabah n'était autre que le bras droit de Zouber Pacha, l'ami bien connu des Anglais ?

Enfin, plus au sud, secondée par un homme d'une vaste intelligence et d'un mérite sans égal, Cecil Rhodes, l'Angleterre poursuivait sa campagne du Cap de Bonne-Espérance à Zanzibar.

Les petits Etats qui sont semés le long des côtes de l'Afrique sont sans avenir par eux-mêmes, tandis que les Colonies Allemandes, Italiennes, Portugaises, et Espagnoles ne sauraient grandir.

L'Etat Indépendant du Congo et qui du reste ne peut plus guère s'augmenter de nouveaux territoires, la France et l'Angleterre, voilà les trois Puissances qui se partageront l'Afrique.

L'Angleterre a fait tout son possible pour que l'œuvre de pénétration ne s'accomplisse pas. Elle se rendait bien compte, en effet, de l'immense avantage que ce fait nous donnerait sur elle.

Aussi, si nous voulons mener à bien l'œuvre de la France en Afrique, finissons-nous par reconnaître que seul, le chemin de fer du Transsaharien Central nous permettra d'arriver les premiers.

Encore faudrait-il qu'il soit construit avant la création de la ligne télégraphique d'Alexandrie au Cap et dont l'établissement sera forcément suivi de la création d'un chemin de fer qui porterait un coup mortel à notre influence.

No. 74.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 5, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, as the result of the further inquiry which, as I had the honour of stating in my despatch No. 80 of the 28th ultimo, I intended making with reference to the amount of damages caused to the mole at Bizerta by the late gale, a report which I have just received from what I cannot but consider as a good authority. The actual damage according to this account is, as I ventured to anticipate, less than what was reported by the correspondent of the "Union," and more than that reported by the British Acting Consular Agent, in reply to my request for information on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 74.

Report received by Consul-General Haggard.

JE m'empresse à vous communiquer la réponse que j'ai reçue de Bizerte au sujet des effets de la dernière bourrasque. La jetée sud a été démolie pour la longueur de 300 mètres, le phare de cette jetée a disparu et deux grues à vapeur qui avaient eu le même sort ont pu être repêchées.

A noter qu'outre le phare enlevé par la mer, il y en a un autre sur la jetée nord et deux plus petits sur deux éperons qui protègent dans l'avant-port l'accès du canal.

Tunis, le 5 Novembre, 1895.

No. 75.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 88. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 18, 1895.

SUBSEQUENT to his letter on the subject of the damage done to the works at Bizerta by the late gale which I had the honour to inclose in my despatch No. 84 of the 5th instant, my informant states that, in order to verify accurately his assertions, he took a boat so as to examine minutely the injuries, and that he found them exactly as he had stated, save that there was also some damage done to the northern pier.

Your Lordship may recollect that the British Acting Consular Agent, in his despatch of which I had the honour of inclosing a copy in my despatch No. 80 of the 26th October last, attributing to the "Union" a statement which that paper had not made as to the northern pier having been injured, denied that it had, and drew therefrom the conclusion that the eastern pier had only suffered owing to the work having only been constructed recently, and not having had time to settle.

If, however, my informant be correct, his statement not only disproves that of Mr. Spezzichino, but demolishes his deduction, as the northern pier has been concluded for a long time, considerably over a year, I believe, and was, moreover, less exposed to the wind than was the eastern, so it would seem possible that the danger to the construction from a gale may be one which may arise on other occasions in the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 76.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 19, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy and translation of a despatch from the Acting Consular Agent at Bizerta, informing me that notices have been put up in that town, signed by the Captain of Artillery, inviting tenders for the construction of an arsenal at a cost not exceeding 123,000 fr. Mr. Spezzichino calls attention to the fact that no place is specified for the construction of the "arsenal." The place which goes by that name now is situated at the extreme end of the lake, many miles away from the sea. It is possible, however, that the place meant may be the ground which was expropriated for the construction of a "pare d'artillerie," as so marked on the map inclosed in my despatch No. 75 of the 7th October, and my Italian colleague informs me that his agent has so reported, and that the sum allotted for the construction amounts to 133,000 fr., not 123,000 fr. as reported by Mr. Spezzichino.

I am requesting Mr. Spezzichino to give me further information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Mr. Spezzichino to Consul-General Haggard.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Bizerta Consular Agency, November 12, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to report that notices, signed by the local Captain of Artillery, were to-day posted up on the town walls, inviting tenders—to be adjudicated on the 26th November—for the construction of an arsenal at a cost of about 123,000 fr.

The position of the said arsenal was not, however, indicated, but will be known as soon as the works have been begun.

I have, &c.
(Signed) N. S. SPEZZICHINO.

No. 77.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 31, 1895.

IN my despatch No. 86 of the 14th instant, I have mentioned that, in view of the feeling in his colony, the Italian Agent and Consul-General thought it advisable to call the Resident-General's attention to the bad effects which might be produced by the constant attacks on it of the French press. Since then the "Dépêche," the only paper here over which the Resident has any practical influence, has been much more reticent and moderate in tone.

M. Macchiavelli has told me that in the course of the conversation the Resident expressed surprise that the editor of the Italian paper, the "Unione," had never been to call on him; to which M. Macchiavelli had replied that, frankly, M. Millet could hardly expect that he would do so in view of the attitude and words with reference to the Italian colony hitherto attributed to him, and then went on to say, "You will forgive my saying so, but you have not hitherto been 'trop habile' in your treatment of Italians; 'Pourquoi brusquer tant de questions?'"

M. Macchiavelli told me that M. Millet took this little lecture, which, as he said, six months back would have led to a violent outburst, in very good part, saying that when he first came here he did not understand the situation, which he had taken "en gros;" that now he saw that, failing French, who apparently could not be persuaded to come here, the laborious Italian population must be encouraged and fostered. M. Macchiavelli added that, in the ardour of his new-born enthusiasm, he even spoke in

high terms of the Sicilians who flock here. This certainly shows great indulgence, for the Sicilian colony, though it has doubtless many hard-working men amongst its members, contains also as many cut-throats and gaol-birds as, I fancy, could be found among any population of equal proportions. Many of them are escaped criminals, or men who have served their time, and nearly all the many crimes of violence which weekly take place are committed by Sicilians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

No. 78.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 92. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 27, 1895.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy and translation of a Notice from the "Unione," giving an account of the damage recently done to the new fishery works which extend across the gut of the Lake of Bizerta. This current would appear likely to be one from the lake seawards, possibly caused by the recent rains, but, as usual, I have no information from the Acting Consular Agent; and although I am writing to him for information, can, as your Lordship will have observed, by no means rely on the accuracy of the intelligence which he will consequently give me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. D. HAGGARD.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Extract from the "Unione" of November 24, 1895.

(Translation.)

IN the recent storm, as I have elsewhere had occasion to inform the readers of the "Unione," the violence of the waves produced by a wind—a veritable hurricane—coming from the north-north-east, partially destroyed the southern jetty, dispersing about 300 metres of the wall, carried away a provisional lighthouse placed thereon, damaged even the northern jetty already thoroughly consolidated, and would, had it lasted longer, have swept away the other iron lighthouse, just as it tore from their positions two steam revolving cranes and precipitated them into the sea. Now the irresistible strength of the internal current in the lake, forcing itself among the iron screwed stakes of the barrier, has torn them up, and has carried away—they being completely lost—the steel nets forming the new fishery, which were believed to be indestructible. The loss certainly amounts to more than 50,000 fr.

As is thus seen, this splendid harbour has certain unfortunate disadvantages. Should the sea become rough, the entry is at least hypothetical; and should the affluents to the lake increase in volume, the current becomes so violent as to be a real source of danger.

But for a naval port it appears that this difficulty is not of any great importance. The proof of this is that the works of the arsenal have been begun. A commencement is being made with the "pare d'artillerie," which is of immense size, situated on the shore of the Sebka, that is, of the so-called Commercial Harbour, and which at the same time guards the entrance to the lake. Instead of being an artillery barrack, as might be understood by the name "pare," it is really a completely equipped arsenal—a dépôt for powder, shells, mitrailleuses, projectiles of every kind, repairing workshops, &c.—in fine, everything necessary for the rapid fitting out of a fleet, and for putting an army on a war footing.

No. 79.

Consul-General Haggard to the Marquess of Salisbury.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 93. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Tunis, November 28, 1895.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 90 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in reply to my inquiry, the Acting Consular Agent at Bizerta reports that the tenders asked towards the construction of the arsenal at Bizerta amount to 122,172 fr., and not to 133,000 fr. as stated by my other informant.

Mr. Spezzichino adds that he has lately learnt that the place where the arsenal is to be constructed is the "parc d'artillerie," thus confirming my other information on this point.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. H. D. HAGGARD.